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ABSTRACT 
CANADIAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
PROCESS OF POLICY-MAKING FOR IRAQI REFUGEES 
 
by 
 
Mia Gauthier 
 
The American University in Cairo 
 
 
The purpose of this research is to understand how the Canadian government came to 
decide when was the opportune time to begin the resettlement of Iraqis, what 
magnitude these resettlement operations would take, and whom, amongst the millions 
of Iraqis displaced by the war following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, would be selected 
for resettlement to Canada.  The research identifies different sets of influences on the 
policy-making process related to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees to Canada, and 
explores how these resettlement policies were initiated, developed, implemented, and 
shaped over time.  A literature review is undertaken on the history of the rationale 
supporting the use of resettlement as a possible durable solution to refugee crises.  
Expert interviews were conducted with representatives of the Government of Canada, 
UNHCR Ottawa, Amnesty International Canada, the Canadian Council for Refugees, 
Iraqi community organizations in Canada, and other experts in the field, in order to 
collect factual accounts, as well as personal and institutional perspectives on the topic.  
It was found that the most delimiting factor was the budget allocated to the 
resettlement program, determined by the Canadian Parliament.  In turn, the Parliament 
was said to be most influenced, on the one hand, by the insistently expressed opinions 
of Canadian voters, and, on the other, by the necessity to retain Canada’s 
humanitarian image.  Where and how the budget is spent is highly dependent upon the 
directives of UNHCR.  The budget is also allocated strategically in order to maximize 
the leverage of resettlement operations for all those affected – refugee populations and 
asylum countries alike.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of authors have looked at how refugee resettlement policies of a given 
country are formed and how they evolve.  Refugee resettlement was a preferred 
durable solution to refugee crises, and the subject of many studies from the late 
seventies to the early nineties, after which it became less frequently applied by the 
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
main resettlement countries of the time.  In the late eighties and nineties, two other 
possible durable solutions to refugee crises took precedence: local integration in the 
country of first asylum, and voluntary repatriation to the country of origin.  In the 
context of the resettlement operations that took place following the Second World 
War, and until the end of the large-scale resettlement of the Vietnamese boat people in 
the 1980s and early 90s, resettlement countries tended to accept large numbers of 
individuals under their refugee resettlement programs according to the populations’ 
need for resettlement as determined by UNHCR.  Lippert and others1 outlined some of 
the reasons for a change in the trend of mass refugee resettlement operations, such as 
the weakening of the economies of the potential resettlement states, and the ensuing 
difficulties for these states to justify to their citizens the intake and financial and social 
support of these vulnerable populations.  Such factors, among others, have since 
brought these states and UNHCR to prioritize the implementation of other durable 
solutions to refugee crises over resettlement.   
 
However, resettlement operations worldwide have far from ceased since this period, 
despite the fact that resettlement is found to be the most expensive durable solution 
for governments and UNHCR to implement.  This is mostly due to the high overseas 
                                                           
1 Lippert, R. (1998).  Rationalities and refugee resettlement, Economy and Society, vol 27, no 4, pp 
380-406. 
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resettlement processing costs, and to the considerable costs of the integration services 
and financial assistance offered to refugees upon their arrival to the country of 
resettlement.  Despite these costs, however, the original aim of resettlement according 
to UNHCR and to the major receiving countries was for resettlement to be made an 
option for a) the most vulnerable members of a concerned refugee population, and b) 
individuals or groups for whom both local repatriation and voluntary repatriation are 
not feasible, or not expected to be feasible within a reasonable period of time.  Over 
time, resettlement has been used more sparingly.  However, as discovered over the 
course of this research, it has been used more strategically, with the aim of alleviating 
a number of the consequences of mass refugee flows, all whilst resettling only a select 
few.2,3 
 
Context of the post-2003 Iraqi refugee movement 
Iraqi refugee flows have been ongoing since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
According to many Iraqis, international workers in Iraq, and even UNHCR, this 
situation of mass exodus was not expected to dissipate for some time to come.4,5,6,7 
According to UNHCR’s Country Operations Profile for Iraq published in early 2010, 
the overall security situation in Iraq was reported to have steadily improved, despite 
the fact that violent events continued to erupt sporadically throughout the country.8  
At the time of writing this research, however, violence in Iraq, especially in Baghdad 
                                                           
2 UNHCR. (2010a).  UNHCR – Resettlement, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html  
3 Pressé, D. (2009). Interview with the author on 15 July 2009.  Ottawa.  [Digital recording in 
possession of the author, Recorded into two parts, A and B] 
4 Reichmann, D. (2009). Cheney: CIA Did Nothing Illegal in Interrogations, January 2009, 
http://i.abcnews.com/Politics/WireStory?id=6606473&page=2  
5 Lubold, G. (2009). Could Iraq violence affect US withdrawal plan?, April 2009, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0424/p02s09-usfp.html 
6 Institute for War and Peace Reporting. (2009). Baghdadis Resigned to Sporadic Violence, 29 May 
2009, ICR No. 291, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a28c218c.html 
7 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2009). Iraqi civilian death toll lowest since 2003, June 2009, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a293d81c.html  
8 UNHCR. (2010b). UNHCR – Iraq, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486426 
 3 
and its surrounding region, seemed to be steadily increasing: 
October 2009 155 are killed in a twin truck bomb attack in Baghdad.9 
 
December 2009 More than 127 are killed in a series of car bombs in Baghdad.10 
 
7 January 2010 Eight are killed in a series of bomb attacks on police in Hit, West of 
Baghdad.11 
 
25 January 2010 More than 36 dead after three large explosions targeting Baghdad 
hotels housing Western businessmen and media.12 
 
1 February 2010 More than 41 killed and 106 injured by a female suicide-bomber in 
Baghdad.13 
 
5 February 2010 Two suicide bombers kill more than 40 and injure more than 140 in 
Karbala.14 
 
22 February 2010 Bombings, beheadings and shootings leave 23 dead, including 9 
children.15 
 
In March 2009, UNHCR announced that 60,000 Iraqis were still in need of 
resettlement.  However, UNHCR also reported that tens of thousands of Iraqis 
returned to Iraq in 2008 and in the first months of 2009 due to improved security 
conditions in Iraq.16  Meanwhile, apart from these 60,000 identified individuals, many 
others were also in great need of the support of the international community, namely, 
other Iraqis perhaps outside of UNHCR’s radar, the states of asylum hosting the 
majority of the Iraqi refugees, and the Iraqi government struggling with its 
reconstruction operations, its returnees, and its highly unstable security situation.  
Also in need of support from the international community in the rest of the world were 
                                                           
9 BBC News. (2009a). BBC News – Violence returns to Iraq, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8402014.stm  
10 BBC News. (2009b). BBC News – Violence returns to Iraq, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8402014.stm 
11 BBC News. (2010a). BBC News – Iraq bomb attack on senior police kills eight, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8444946.stm  
12 BBC News. (2010b). BBC News – Iraq capital rocked by deadly triple bombing, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8478916.stm  
13 BBC News. (2010c). BBC News – Female suicide bomber kills dozens in Iraq, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8490819.stm  
14 BBC News. (2010d). BBC News – Bombings hit Iraq Shia pilgrims in Karbala, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8500131.stm  
15 The New York Times, Spike in Iraq Violence as Vote Nears – NYTimes.com, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/world/middleeast/23iraq.html   
16 UNHCR. (2009a). Iraqi refugees leave Jordan, Syria in first resettlement to Germany, March 2009, 
http://www.unhcr.org/49c273aa2.html  
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the large groups of refugees and/or IDPs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Darfur, Chad, 
South Sudan, and others.   
 
What factors led to Canada’s decision, then, to start prioritizing and increasing the 
resettlement of Iraqis only in 2008 rather than any time before, to reduce resource 
allocations to the resettlement operations for other refugee groups in the rest of the 
world who are in need, and perhaps even more in need at the time?  How and why 
were these priorities identified and implemented? 
 
Recent Resettlement of Iraqis to Canada  
UNHCR has been appealing to the Canadian government and other major resettlement 
countries to take in Iraqis since soon after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.  Canada 
resettled close to 100 Iraqis in 2006, and a total of 900 in 2007.  In 2008, Iraqis 
represented 19.8% of those resettled to Canada, while 15.4% were resettled from 
Colombia, 13.1% from Afghanistan, and less than 3 % from Sudan.17  As many as 
2,134 were resettled in 2008,18 representing more than double the number of Iraqis 
admitted the previous year.  Canada also announced in early 2009 that it planned to 
double this number again in 2009, by resettling a minimum of 12,000 persons out of 
Syria over the next three or four years: 2,500 would be selected every year through the 
Private Sponsorship of Refugees program (PSR), and 1,400 Iraqis would be selected 
by the end of 2009 through the Government-Assisted Refugee Program (GAR).   
 
What are the reasons for these recent increases in Iraqi resettlement numbers in 
                                                           
17 Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR). (2009a). Email communication. Statistics prepared by CCR 
for its members from data provided by CIC for CCR internal use only, 19 March 2009.  This figure 
includes both Government- Assisted and Privately Sponsored refugees. 
18 Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR). (2009a). Email communication. Statistics prepared by CCR 
for its members from data provided by CIC for CCR internal use only, 19 March 2009.  This figure 
includes both Government-Assisted and Privately Sponsored refugees. 
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Canada?  In addition, why was Canada perceived in having a delayed reaction to the 
Iraqi refugee crisis, in comparison to other resettlement countries such as the United 
States, Australia, Sweden, Norway, and others?  The number of Iraqis resettled by 
Canada and other resettlement countries combined over the last few years represents 
only a minimal percentage of the number of Iraqi individuals UNHCR identified to be 
in need of resettlement.  What, then, is Canada’s aim in investing considerable 
amounts of resources, to resettle only a minimal proportion of those in need?  Are the 
few who are resettled some of the most vulnerable Iraqi refugees (what is understood 
to be the original intent of resettlement according to UNHCR and the Canadian 
government)?  How are these policies relating to the resettlement of refugees, and 
more particularly of Iraqis, drafted, implemented, and adapted to the continually 
evolving Iraqi refugee situation?  The author will attempt to shed light on these 
questions throughout this thesis. 
 
 6 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The author has observed a widely spread misunderstanding of the purposes of the 
Canadian Refugee Resettlement Program.  There are some diverging perspectives on 
its core objectives, and a lack of knowledge of the humanitarian, political, and 
economic limitations that shape the system and simply do not allow it to spread in all 
the directions wished by all sides – political leaders, government representatives, 
advocates, the Canadian public, concerned international organizations (such as 
UNHCR), concerned countries of asylum, and refugees themselves.   This observed 
misunderstanding and lack of knowledge, are understood to be the source of much 
criticism and expressed disappointments about Canada’s resettlement program.  Also 
misunderstood are the roles of all concerned parties in the policy-making process.  
 
Through this research, the author thus aimed to gain a better understanding of the 
policy-making process in the case of the Iraqi refugee situation and resettlement to 
Canada.  It is thought that this knowledge will help broaden the understanding of the 
author and other actors and researchers in the field of resettlement, to better 
understand how decisions regarding refugee resettlement are made, and what different 
levels of influences are involved.  The author hopes that by obtaining a clearer and 
more transparent picture of this process through this desk research and interviewing of 
advocates, Canadian service provider organizations, and other partners in the refugee 
resettlement program, that all may gain better understanding of the Canadian 
government’s perspective of the place and functionality of resettlement in the 
contemporary context.  
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SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
Resettlement, as a possible durable solution to refugee crises, was initially meant to be 
applied most particularly in cases where local integration in the country of asylum and 
voluntary repatriation were not possible at current times, or in the foreseeable future.  
Resettlement programs dating prior to the mid-1970s were mainly ad-hoc programs 
that were able to respond to such situations in a timely manner.  With the further 
embedding of resettlement into governmental programming structures, this option 
became tied down with multiple bureaucratic cords, and a heavy financial burden, 
which made this option harder and harder to justify to citizens of major resettlement 
countries.   
 
On the surface, global resettlement operations do not seem to be serving their original 
purposes: to provide a swift and durable solution to refugee crises (other than for the 
small portion of those resettled globally), to resettle those determined as most 
vulnerable, and those not able to permanently integrate into the country of asylum or 
return to their country of origin.  Instead, resettlement seems to be used sparingly, 
rather than according to the actual resettlement needs of refugees, as assessed by 
UNHCR.  What, then, is the value in using resettlement at all, for the small proportion 
of the world’s refugees who will be able to benefit from it?  
 
With regard to the resettlement of Iraqis, although the refugee crisis in and around 
Iraq was ongoing from the time of the onset of the war in 2003, it was only in 2006-
2007 that the Canadian government began considering mass resettlement operations 
for the Iraqi population.  This recent increase and focus on Iraqi refugees also came 
during a period where other populations in the world (e.g. from Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
 8 
Sudan, Chad, Sri Lanka and others) would arguably have greater needs for 
resettlement than the Iraqi population.  What factors, then, explain the timing and the 
breadth of Canada’s altered position on the resettlement of Iraqis?   
 
 9 
CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF RESETTLEMENT AND THE IRAQI REFUGEE 
CRISIS IN RELATION TO CANADA  
 
BACKGROUND 
UNHCR and Resettlement 
Resettlement is one of three main durable solutions to refugee situations established 
by UNHCR, along with local integration in the refugee’s country of first asylum, and 
voluntary repatriation.  It was first determined by the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) to be the preferred durable solution to the plight of the estimated 1 
million European refugees who fled their homes during the Second World War.  The 
next large-scale resettlement operations took place for the approximately 2 million 
Vietnamese boat people resettled between the late seventies and eighties.  However, 
this refugee movement was thought to be associated to very high costs, and 
particularly in terms of the costs of resettlement operations and integration programs 
for this group.19  In addition, during and after these larger waves of resettlement, some 
feared that such mass resettlement operations were possibly creating a ‘pull-factor’, 
and somehow encouraging individuals to flee their countries of origins only in the 
hope of being resettled.20  Durable solutions to refugee crises thus began to be re-
thought, and re-shaped by UNHCR, major receiving states, and other international 
actors.  In the 1990s, further emphasis was placed on voluntary repatriation, the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Ms. Sadako Ogota, even designating the nineties as 
the decade of voluntary repatriation. Local integration was then also favored over 
resettlement whenever possible.21     
  
                                                           
19 Loescher, G. (2008).  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): the politics 
and practice of refugee protection into the twenty-first century, Routledge, p.48. 
20 Casasola, M. (2001).  Current Trends and New Challenges for Canada’s Resettlement Program, 
Refuge, 19 (4), p. 77. 
21 Loescher, G. Ibid. 
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Canada’s history of resettlement and related legislation  
One of CIC’s official missions is to work towards building a stronger Canada, by 
notably maintaining Canada’s humanitarian tradition through protecting refugees and 
others in refugee-like situations.  It is thus CIC’s aim to have an approach to 
immigration that supports global humanitarian efforts to assist those in need of 
protection.22  This aim drives Canada’s refugee resettlement program and reflects the 
commitment made by Canada when ratifying the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.  
The Canadian government and its citizens take much pride in being considered by the 
world as a leading humanitarian country.  Canada is the second resettlement and 
asylum country after the United States.  It is considered one of the leaders in the 
resettlement of both refugees and other individuals in need of protection.  With its 
resettlement program, Canada aims to bring the concerned individuals in the country, 
inter alia, to contribute in making Canada a richer and more prosperous society.23  
The latter aim is implemented through the Canadian resettlement policy related to the 
refugees’ potential to successfully establish themselves in Canada, although this 
resettlement criterion is applied more or less heavily, depending on the level of 
protection needs of the applicant.24  
 
Canada’s resettlement program came into existence some time after the end of World 
War II.  Since this period, the country has resettled over 700,000 Convention 
Refugees and persons in refugee-like situations.25  In 1969, Canada ratified both the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter 
                                                           
22 CIC. (2009b). Who we are, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/mission.asp  
23 CIC. (2008b). What Canada is doing to help refugees, July 2008 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/help.asp  
24 UNHCR. (2007a). UNHCR Resettlement Handbook and Country Chapters – Canada, 
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3c5e55594.pdf 
25 Ibid. 
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named 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).26  These international instruments are 
today incorporated into Canadian law through section 96 of the 2002 Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA): 
 
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion, 
 
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason 
of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those 
countries; or 
 
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former 
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return 
to that country.27 
 
The 2002 IRPA was also shaped by criticisms of Canada’s resettlement activities 
received in the 1980s and 90s, concerning the slow speed and lengthiness of Canada’s 
resettlement processing, and thus its inability to meet the needs of refugees with 
urgent protection needs.  However, in its attempt to respond to these concerns, Canada 
aimed increased the settlement potential of the populations selected for resettlement.  
In doing so, however, Canada also limited the access to resettlement to individuals 
who would potentially present excessive demand on the Canadian public health 
system, or to those who may be unable to demonstrate a potential ability to quickly 
and successfully establish themselves.28   
 
In response to these limitations and operational issues, the Refugee Resettlement 
Model (RRM) was developed in 1997, and proposed the following measures:  
                                                           
26 UN. (2010). United Nations Treaty Collections, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&Temp=
mtdsg2&lang=en  
27 Department of Justice Canada. (2001). Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Section 96, 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/I-2.5/page-4.html  
28 Casasola, M. (2001). Ibid. p.78-79. 
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• To prioritize refugees’ protection rather than their potential ability to 
successfully establish themselves once in Canada 
• To prioritize family reunification 
• To ensure the immediate resettlement of urgent protection cases.29 
 
These measures and others were incorporated into bill C-31, which was later 
incorporated into the 2002 IRPA.  The 2002 IRPA also notably removed the 
‘excessive medical demand’ criterion for refugee applicants.30   
 
Canadian resettlement statistical figures 
Resettled refugees account for approximately 4 to 6% of all immigrants to Canada.  If 
added to the proportion of individuals who represent successful asylum claimants, the 
total percentage of protected persons selected by Canada in proportion to all migrants 
to Canada is between 10 and 13%.31  Canada, along with the United States and 
Australia, oversees one of the three largest existing refugee resettlement programs.  
As a point of comparison, in 2008, the United States resettled 60,108 refugees and 
admitted 22,930 asylum claimants (totaling to 83,038 individuals),32 Canada admitted 
a total of 21,860,33 and Australia, a total of 14,000.34  This represented a proportion of 
1 for every 3,667 individuals in the United States,35 1 for every 1,539 individuals in 
                                                           
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p.79. 
31 Pressé, D. Ibid., Part A, 0:10-0:11m. 
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2009). Annual Flow Report, Refugees and Asylees: 2008, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2008.pdf   
33 CIC. (2010ba). Facts and Figures 2008: Immigration Overview: Permanent and temporary residents, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2008/permanent/02.asp  
34 Pressé, D. Ibid., 0:33m. 
35 The population of Unites States in 2008 was of 304,059,724.  Obtained from U.S. Census Bureau. 
(2009). Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto 
Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 (NST-EST2008-01), http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-
est2008.html  
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Australia,36 and 1 for every 1,524 individuals in Canada.37  A total of sixteen countries 
have a yearly quota of refugees they admit to their territories, while other countries 
only run ad-hoc programs set up according to the needs of a given refugee population 
at a given time.38  
 
Canada’s three resettlement programs  
Canada has three main resettlement programs: the Government-Assisted Refugee 
(GAR) Program,39 the Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) program,40 and the 
Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) program.41  Those resettled under the GAR 
program are referred to Canada by UNHCR, and are supported financially by the 
Canadian government, and assisted by the staff of Canadian Service Provider 
Organizations (SPOs).  On the other hand, Canadian individuals or organizations 
wishing to sponsor a refugee for resettlement to Canada must submit a PSR 
application for this individual or family to CIC.  Canadian visa offices can also 
suggest a case to be resettled by a Private Sponsor (Visa Office Referral – VOR).42  
Once the private sponsorship application is approved by CIC, or that a VOR is 
matched to a Canadian sponsor, a Sponsorship Agreement is signed, and the file is 
sent to the visa office abroad for adjudication.  Private Sponsors are entirely 
responsible for the cost of the application process, and for the financial assistance 
                                                           
36 The population of Australia in 2008 was of 21,542,500.  Obtained from Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. (2008). 3101.0 – Australian Demographic Statistics, Sep 2008, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/3101.0Main+Features1Sep+2008  
37 The population of Canada in 2008 was of 33,311,400.  Obtained from Statistics Canada. (2008). The 
Daily, Monday, September 29, 2008. Canada’s population estimates, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-
quotidien/080929/dq080929b-eng.htm   
38 Pressé, D. Ibid., 0:04-0:08m. 
39 CIC. (2005a). Government-Assisted Refugee Program, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/outside/resettle-gov.asp  
40 CIC. (2010a). Sponsoring refugees: Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/sponsor/private.asp 
41 CIC. (2007a).  Sponsoring refugees: Joint Assistance Sponsorship, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/sponsor/jas.asp  
42 CIC. (2005b). Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/ref-sponsor.pdf  
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provided to the refugees for up to one year.  Sponsors are also responsible for 
assisting refugees in their settlement process, also for up to one year.  Lastly, the Joint 
Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) program represents a combination of the GAR and PSR 
programs.  Cases are referred or selected in the same manner as the PSR program, 
although individuals will receive financial assistance from the Canadian government 
for up to three years, and the sponsors will assist the refugees through their process of 
resettlement during the same period.  
 
The existence of these different protection programs thus allows for a greater number 
of individuals to be resettled to Canada through different channels.  Through these 
programs, Canada is able to offer resettlement to the most vulnerable (through the 
GAR program), to promote family or community reunification (through the PSR 
program), and also to allow access to those who may have otherwise fallen under 
other programs’ radars (through the PSR and JAS programs). 
 
History of Iraqis in Canada 
While between 1945 and 1975, less than 200 Iraqis immigrated to Canada, between 
1975 and 1992, 6,472 Iraqis immigrated to the country.  According to the Canadian 
Census, by 2006, approximately 29,950 individuals of Iraqi origin lived in Canada.43  
This is a significant increase when compared to the 1991 Census, which recorded only 
4,790 Iraqis in Canada.  However, reports from community sources state that the Iraqi 
                                                           
43 Statistics Canada. (2006). ‘Ethnic Origin (247), Single and Multiple Ethnic Origin Responses (3) and 
Sex (3) for the Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census 
Agglomerations, 2006 Census - 20% Sample Data’ 
http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/topics/RetrieveProductTable.cfm?TPL=RETR&ALEV
EL=3&APATH=3&CATNO=&DETAIL=0&DIM=&DS=99&FL=0&FREE=0&GAL=0&GC=99&G
K=NA&GRP=1&IPS=&METH=0&ORDER=1&PID=92333&PTYPE=88971&RL=0&S=1&ShowAll
=No&StartRow=1&SUB=801&Temporal=2006&Theme=80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEf= 
 15 
population in Canada in 1991 was already over 25,000.44  This discrepancy may be 
due to the fact that many Iraqis, fearing retaliation from individuals still associated to 
the Iraqi regime, concealed their true identity or Iraqi origin.   Also, between the time 
of publication of the 1991 census and the time that data from these community 
sources was being collected,45 a considerable wave of Iraqis, mainly Shiites, arrived in 
Canada during and after the Gulf War, due to the instability and continuing oppressive 
climate in the country.  Lastly, the discrepancy could also be attributed to the fact that 
many Iraqis identified themselves to other groups, such as Assyrians, Chaldeans, and 
Kurds, rather than only Iraqi.46 
 
Gulf Wars and the increase of Iraqi resettlement to Canada   
On August 2nd 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, after which the UN Security Council called 
for an immediate withdrawal, and voted for Resolution 661, which imposed a range of 
economic sanctions on Iraq.  In January 1991, the first Gulf War began with a U.S.-
led offensive against Iraq.  After four days of more intense ground operations in 
February 1991, Kuwait was liberated, and Iraq later accepted the terms of a 
ceasefire.47  Meanwhile, in Canada, resettlement operations for Iraqis began soon after 
the beginning of the first Gulf War.   
 
More than a decade after the First Gulf War ceasefire, in January 2002, President 
George W. Bush listed Iraq as one of the ‘axes of evil’ in his weekly address to the 
American public.  In September of the same year, British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
introduced documents allegedly proving that Iraq held within its borders weapons of 
                                                           
44 Shuraydi, M. A. (1998) ‘Iraqis’ in The Encyclopedia of Canada’s Peoples, 
http://www.multiculturalcanada.ca/Encyclopedia/A-Z/i7/1  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid. 
47 UNHCR. (2009b). Iraq chronology, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=history 
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mass destruction.  UN weapons inspectors entered Iraq the following November, and 
returned with no confirmation of such allegations.  Despite this, the U.S. and its allies 
launched another offensive in March 2003, and Saddam Hussein was later captured in 
December of the same year.48   
 
Between 1991 and 2005, Canada resettled a total of 15,975 Iraqis: 
Table 1: Iraqis resettled to Canada since 1991*  
Year Iraqis Resettled Year Iraqis Resettled 
1991 270 2001 1,130 
1992 1,170 2002 920 
1993 2,230 2003 530 
1994 1,340 2004 720 
1995 1,160 2005 520 
1996 2,240 2006 90** 
1997 1,115 2007 900 
1998 780 2008 2,134 
1999 690 2009 3,900*** 
2000 1,160   
 
*Data for 1991 obtained from UNHCR. (2003a). Iraqi Refugees Around the World, 
http://www.unhcr.org/3e79b00b9.pdf.  Data for 1992 to 2006 obtained from UNHCR. (2007b). 
Statistics on Displaced Iraqis Around The World, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
in/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=461f7cb92.  Data for 2007 to 2009 obtained from 
Pressé, D. (2009). Ibid.   
**2006 figure represents only the number of referrals submitted to Canada by UNHCR. 
***2009 figure represents Canada’s projected number of Iraqis who were expected to be resettled in 
2009.  The total number of Iraqis resettled in 2009 was not yet made public at the time of writing. 
 
As can be noticed in Table 1, the resettlement of Iraqis to Canada seemed to have 
began approximately two years after the onset of the First Gulf War, and increased 
again in 2000 following the Second Gulf War.  Interestingly, however, it is only four 
years after the onset of the 2003 war in Iraq – which resulted in more massive 
population movements than the First and Second Gulf Wars combined49 – that 
resettlement numbers began to increase again. 
                                                           
48 Ibid. 
49 UNHCR. (2003b).  Iraqi Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Statistics, March 2003, Iraqi Refugees Around 
the World, http://www.unhcr.org/3e79b00b9.pdf  
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Iraqis have since been fleeing their country in both steady flows and large waves, first 
after the initial U.S.-led invasion of 2003, and also after the bombing of the Shia 
Muslim Al Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006, which spurted increased 
sectarian violence and population displacement.50  Meanwhile, although Canada had 
resettled on average 1,170 Iraqis per year between 1992 and 2002, despite this 
increased violence, instability, and population displacement in Iraq, only 530, 720, 
and 520 Iraqis were resettled by Canada in 2003, 2004, 2005, respectively.51  
Moreover, only 90 Iraqi refugees had been referred by UNHCR and resettled by 
Canada by the end of 2006.52  Numbers of resettled Iraqis in Canada increased in 2007 
with a total of 900 Iraqis being admitted to the country,53 and 2,134 more were 
admitted in 2008.54  Finally, Canada expected to resettle a total of 3900 Iraqis over the 
course of 2009.55   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Refugee policies in Canada were first based on the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees that were both signed by Canada in 
1969.56  However, it was only in 1978 that refugee determination decisions became 
formal and non-discretionary, with the implementation of the Canadian Immigration 
Act.  In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada’s declared in the case of Singh et 
al. v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) that a large part of the 
                                                           
50 UNHCR. (2009b). 
51 UNHCR.  (2007b).  Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Pressé, D. (2009). Ibid. 
54 CCR. (2009a). Ibid. 
55 CIC. (2009a). Resettlement – One Durable Solution in the Global Refugee Protection Regime, 
Presentation for the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, June 2009, p.12. 
56 Dolin, B. R. & M. Young. (2002). Canada’s Refugee Protection System (BP-185E) 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp185-e.htm#immigration2tx  
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refugee protection system at the time was at odds with the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.57  It was following this ruling that the Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB) was established.  Created by the Parliament of Canada, the IRB is an 
independent tribunal notably mandated to adjudicate all asylum claims registered in 
Canada, as well as to receive appeals relating to immigration decisions, and orders for 
removal.58  The IRB system underwent legislation changes in 1992 and 1995, and was 
also later modified by the implementation of the 2002 IRPA.  Above and beyond the 
IRPA and 1951 Convention, also shaping Canada’s humanitarian obligations are the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as will later be 
highlighted by those interviewed in the context of this study.   
 
IHein59 identified national financial concerns as one of the influencing factors in 
shaping a state’s refugee resettlement system.  However, he also added that a 
country’s foreign policy, as well as national public pressure may sway politicians on 
one side or another and thus contribute in determining the country’s level of 
commitment to refugee populations in need of resettlement.   
 
Lippert60 looked into the changes in the Canadian refugee resettlement program from 
the 1970s to the end of the 1990s.  He found that the Canadian program shifted from 
being based on principles of ‘liberal welfare’ from the 1970s to early 80s, to those he 
describes as ‘advanced liberal’ from the early 80s and into the 90s.  The initial goal of 
                                                           
57 Dolin, B. R. & M. Young. (2002). Canada’s Refugee Protection System (BP-185E) 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp185-e.htm#immigration2tx 
58 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB). (2010). About the Immigration and Refugee Board 
of Canada, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/brdcom/abau/Pages/Index.aspx  
59 Hein, J. (1993). ‘Refuges, Immigrants, and the State’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol 19, pp 43-59. 
60 Lippert, R. Ibid. 
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the Canadian refugee protection program when it took a more formal structure in the 
1970s, according to Lippert, was to provide protection to individuals who were at risk 
of being exposed to immediate physical danger or death through selection and refugee 
status determination, and from moral and mental dangers through resettlement.61  
Since the experience of the large-scale and high-cost resettlement program for the 
Vietnamese boat people, which largely took place between the late 70s and early 80s, 
Lippert reported that the Canadian government later became merely involved in 
financing resettlement activities, rather than providing first-line services through its 
governmental agencies, thus making the best use possible of low-cost or free services 
offered by contracted Service Provider Organizations (SPOs) and their volunteers.  
 
Lippert highlighted that Canada’s refugee program thus initially stemmed from social 
sciences and humanitarian principles, and then moved towards a system that 
prioritized accounting and cost-benefit analyses.  This perspective regarding the move 
away from humanitarian principles was also supported by Chimni,62 who argued that 
“humanitarian factors do not shape the refugee policies of the dominant states in the 
international system.” [emphasis added by the author] He claimed that there is a “need 
to be alert to the non-humanitarian objectives which are pursued by these actors from 
time to time behind the facade of humanitarianism.”63  According to Basok, in line 
with both Lippert’s and Chimni’s perspectives, refugees were simply not viewed as 
positively serving Canada’s economic interests, despite the fact that at the time of 
Basok’s writing in 1996, refugees admitted to Canada (mainly of European origin), 
                                                           
61 Ibid., p.381. 
62 Chimni, B.S. (2004) From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of 
Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 23 (3), pp 55-73. 
63 Lippert, R. Ibid. p.58. 
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did not differ considerably from those admitted under the economic migrant class in 
terms of their socio-economic and demographic characteristics.64   
 
Lippert also argued that this movement towards principles of ‘advanced welfare’ also 
represented a move towards a more local type of management of the program, rather 
than a centralized management associated with a liberal welfare system.  He based his 
interpretation of this shift in Canadian resettlement policy on his observation of an 
increased trend of the Canadian government towards delegating settlement services to 
SPOs and individual citizens, thus decentralizing the management of the resettlement 
program to the provincial governments, and hence ‘de-responsibilizing’ the 
government from the delivery of the program’s services.  He also pointed to policies 
put into place during the same period, which increased the level of responsibility put 
on the refugees for assuming their own resettlement, by having them pay a 975$ 
landing fee required from all immigrants to Canada, in addition to the fee of 500$ for 
the administrative processing of their landed immigrant status application.  The Right 
of Landing fee paid by incoming refugees was thus expected to account for over half 
of the costs of the resettlement program incurred by the federal government,65 
evidently taking away from the principle of providing humanitarian assistance to some 
of the world’s most vulnerable people. 
 
With regards to this observed decentralization of services and responsibilities, 
however, Basok disagreed.  She observed that despite appeared movement towards a 
decentralization of responsibilities, civil and humanitarian groups defending the 
interests of refugees had had no more than a minor impact on Canada’s refugee policy 
                                                           
64 Basok, T.  (1996).  Refugee Policy, Globalization Radical Challenge, or State Control?  Studies in 
Political Economy, 50, Summer 1996, p.145. 
65 Lippert, R. p.387. 
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in the last 25 years.  She argued that although the Canadian government may seemed 
to have been decentralizing its services and decision powers in relation to refugee 
resettlement, it was in fact retaining complete control over those who will be allowed 
into Canada.  She also argued that Canada had implemented more restrictive policies 
in response to financial crises, increased xenophobia, and the idea held by some 
members of the Canadian public that refugees significantly increase the strain on the 
Canadian welfare system.66  She added: “[…] the state does not sacrifice its essential 
interests, and organizes this support in order to attain national goals which serve the 
fundamental long-run interests of the dominant group.”67  She also found that 
although the government “will encourage some independent initiatives in the refugee 
field, [it] will consistently interfere with both private sponsorships and [the 
functioning of] the IRB.”68     
 
Lippert had also highlighted the importance of the 1986 announcement that lead to the 
creation of the IRB, in the hopes of having a Refugee Status Determination System 
that would be removed from the influence of politics, and thus more independent and 
impartial.69  However, despite these efforts, the IRB continued to be criticized for 
being partial, and composed of political allies of the government in power at a given 
time.  The IRB has thus moved, over the last few years, from favoring political 
nomination for its commissioners, to implementing a more thorough recruitment 
system aimed at finding non-partisan, knowledgeable, experienced, and highly 
qualified individuals who can demonstrate the ability to render decisions impartial to 
the political agendas of any particular party or government.  For the purpose of this 
                                                           
66 Basok, T. Ibid. p.133. 
67 Basok, T. Ibid. p.135. 
68 Ibid. p.136-137 
69 Lippert, R. Ibid., p.385. 
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research topic, although the asylum system is administratively separate from the 
refugee resettlement system, the author argues that the context of the system of 
asylum still indicates a tendency of the Canadian government towards, on the one 
hand, attempting to de-politicize and/or privatize the Canadian refugee protection 
system, and to distance itself from the ownership and liability of the program, and on 
the other, keeping some level of control over the selection process of IRB 
commissioners.  
 
Before Lippert, however, Stein70 had highlighted in the early eighties that the context 
in which the resettlement of approximately 1 million European refugees occurred 
between 1947 and 1951, and which was overseen by the IRO at the time, was very 
revealing.  Stein notes that these refugees were accepted by the major resettlement 
countries only after some difficult debates within these countries regarding their 
domestic immigration policies,71 which were to be expected considering the 
unprecedented magnitude of these resettlement operations.  Even more, the IRO had 
only been established by the United Nations as a temporary solution to the specific 
refugee crisis Europe was faced with at the time.72  Thereafter, and until about 1975, 
most countries managed the resettlement of refugees through ad hoc programs.  
However, it is with the resettlement operations that affected over 1 million 
Indochinese between 1975 and beyond Stein’s time of writing in 1983, that major 
                                                           
70 Stein, B. N. (1983). The Commitment to Refugee Resettlement, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 467, The Global Refugee Problem: U.S. and World Response, May 
2008, pp 187-201. 
71 Stein does not elaborate regarding the nature of these debates that occurred on a national level when 
states were deciding whether or not to resettle the Vietnamese boat people.  Further research would be 
needed on this statement.  
72 Stein, B. N. Ibid., p.192. 
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resettlement countries at the time, such as the U.S., Australia, and Canada, began to 
see the need for more permanent resettlement programs and policies.73    
 
Global resettlement figures peeked in 1979 and 1980, Stein points out, but were found 
to have drastically dropped over the subsequent years.  He notes that in contrast to the 
high number of resettled refugees in the mid-seventies and the early eighties, and to 
the great ethnic diversity of these resettled groups, there was a perceptible decrease in 
the commitment of traditional receiving countries towards resettlement towards the 
tail end of this period.  Following this active period of resettlement, he identified some 
of the possible factors that could explain this decrease in commitment, such as: the 
general public’s questioning of who is truly a refugee and who is truly deserving of 
resettlement, poorer economic conditions in receiving countries including higher 
unemployment, an overwhelming number of individuals who would potentially need 
to be resettled, and the integration challenges experienced by some refugee 
populations.  Other factors that could explain a decrease in resettlement numbers, but 
that did not necessarily imply a decrease in commitment, according to Stein, included: 
the reduced numbers of refugees in the camps of first asylum in South East Asia; a 
shift on the part of UNHCR and of other international organizations away from 
resettlement, and towards voluntary repatriation or local integration; and an increased 
willingness of countries of first asylum to allow for long-term hosting of refugee 
populations.74  
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Beiser75 argued that due to its intake of approximately 300,000 immigrants per year, 
representing about 1% of its existing population, Canada has made immigration one of 
its most debated issues, and greatest challenge.  While refugees only represent a small 
proportion of this quota (between 5 and 10%), Beiser observed that Canada prides 
itself on treating refugees fairly and compassionately.  He also argues, however, that 
the limited amount of resources allocated to arrival and integration services do not 
demonstrate such a commitment.  Rather, the limited allocations of funding are more 
of an indication that Canada may be admitting a certain number of refugees in order to 
save its humanitarian reputation, a more instrumental objective, rather than 
representing a trend towards the reproduction of truly humanitarian values and 
continued humanitarian action.  This argument by Beiser is also supported by 
Neuwirth,76 who argued that refugee resettlement policies are moving towards being 
completely shaped by foreign policies, and being informed by ‘calculated kindness’, 
rather than intentions based on humanitarian principles.  This perspective was also 
supported by Loescher, who referred to “narrow self-interest calculations of sovereign 
nation-states,”77 and that refugees at times are used as political pawns in the 
government’s pursuit if its foreign policy agenda, and in the aim of “embarrassing or 
destabilizing enemy governments.”78    
 
Also according to Basok, the Canadian government had a considerable influence on 
the ‘anti-refugee hysteria’ in Canada, feeding on the misconceptualization of refugees, 
as simple economic migrants individuals aiming to take advantage of the Canadian 
                                                           
75 Beiser, M. (2006).  Longitudinal Research to Promote Effective Refugee Resettlement, Transcultural 
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systems.79  This misconceptualization led to the inclusion of particular elements in the 
C-31 bill, which was found to favor the resettlement of refugees, its provisions at the 
same time limited individuals’ access to the inland refugee determination system.80 
 
Parallel shifts in the application of durable solutions and in the profile of refugees 
resettled to Canada 
Stein pointed out that a durable solution was initially meant to help “the refugees to 
become self-sufficient, enabling them to integrate and participate fully in the social 
and economic life of their new country, or their homeland if they repatriate.”81  
However, he argued that resettlement was quickly moved to being considered as an 
exceptional solution that should only be applied when the two other main solutions are 
simply not possible, even for an undetermined, but likely long period of time.  Stein 
denotes a ‘tug’ in the context of refugee resettlement programs between a state’s 
willingness and moral obligations to intervene in refugee-producing emergencies, and 
its wish to establish a controlled and regularized system to manage resettlement 
programs.  He argues that while states attempt to establish programs that would allow 
for a regular flow of refugee resettlement, there is of course no such thing as regular 
and predictable production of refugee flows. 82 
 
Regarding this context and shift from prioritizing resettlement to designating 
voluntary repatriation and local integration as the preferred solutions to refugee crises, 
Chimni presumed that “since refugees from the South were now making their way to 
the North, and since there was at present no shortage of labour, it was time [for the 
resettlement community] to rethink the solution of resettlement in other than the 
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80 Cassasola, M. (2001). Ibid., p.79. 
81 Stein, B.N. Ibid., p. 190. 
82 Ibid., p.196. 
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limited Cold War context.”83  Chimni thus assumed that the resettlement community, 
here including the major countries of resettlement and UNHCR, was suddenly no 
longer ready to consider mass resettlement operations an option for refugees of non-
European origins.  Moreover, Chimni emphasized that although UNHCR claimed 
there was not enough scholarly work that had looked into voluntary repatriation as a 
durable solution to refugee problems, the UNHCR Executive Committee proceeded to 
adopt in 1985, without further scholarly studies on the topic, a key conclusion on 
voluntary repatriation which urged the international community to consider this 
strategy as a preferred durable solution to refugee problems.84,85 Advocates of 
voluntary repatriation thus made the assumption that all refugees wished to return 
home, without ever verifying if such an assumption was accurate for some, most or all 
of the refugees of the world.86   
 
From the early 1990s to the early years of 2000, Casasola also noted a shift in the 
profile of the refugees resettled by Canada.  The resettlement of individuals with 
special needs – such as women at risk, elderly refugees, and some with medical needs 
– increased from 89 individuals in 1996, to over 550 individuals in 2000.  In addition, 
while there was no legislation to this effect, Canadian visa officers were reported to 
have decreases the application of the ‘ability to establish’ criterion.  In addition, the 
region of origin of the resettled refugees also shifted from Europe in the 1990s, to 
Africa and the Middle East at the beginning of 2000.87  Basok added that those 
resettled in the 1990s were also no longer originating from states determined by 
                                                           
83 Chimni, B.S. Ibid., p.58. 
84 Ibid., pp.55-73. 
85 UNHCR (1985) Voluntary Repatriation, 18 October 1985, No. 40 (XXXVI), 
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86 Chimni, B.S. Ibid., p.59. 
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Canada as representing ideological enemies; refugees could no longer be used as 
political pawns, and would be seen as merely burdens to state.88 
 
Medical and security checks – causing limited access and delay 
Casasola also identified security and medical screening procedures as considerably 
limiting those admissible for resettlement to Canada.  While UNHCR will already 
execute one level of security screening by applying the exclusions outlined in the 
1951 Convention, Canada will still refuse some UNHCR-referred cases based on 
security grounds – cases that are at times subsequently accepted by the United States 
or the Netherlands.  This is in addition to the fact that Canada was also found to be 
slow in conducting its security reviews, which created additional delays in the 
resettlement operations.  Casasola also warned that Canada’s medical restrictions 
should make sure to only limit access to those who could legitimately cause a threat to 
the health of the Canadian public,89 and that medical requirements should be 
consistent across all resettlement countries, to reduce on the costs of the countries’ 
respective medical screening processes, and on the time spent by UNHCR to meet 
each and every one’s medical and security requirements.90 
 
Resettlement models 
Lanphier,91 on the other hand, compared four different types of refugee resettlement 
models: 1) a high volume of resettlement with a focus on economic integration, 2) a 
smaller volume of resettlement with a focus on economic integration, 3) a smaller 
volume of resettlement with a focus on cultural adaptation, and 4) a high volume of 
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resettlement with a focus on cultural adaptation.  Below is a graphic summarizing 
Lanphier’s Four types of resettlement models:   
 
Figure 1: Lanphier’s Four Resettlement Models 
The first model, according to Lanphier, represents more closely the American model 
of resettlement, whereby a large number of individuals are resettled, and are expected 
to integrate the host country’s economy as soon as possible.  The second model, 
according to Lanphier, represents the Canadian or French model of resettlement.  It 
should be noted that the resettlement numbers of France today are in no way 
comparable to those of Canada, amounting only to a few hundred per year, compared 
to over 10,000 for Canada.  However, Lanphier argues that their integration aims are 
comparable, i.e. with a focus on the resettled refugees’ quick integration to the 
economy, rather than a focus on assisting them with their cultural adaptation.  The 
third model, Lanphier argues, is most representative of the resettlement and 
integration objectives of Quebec, a French-speaking province in Canada, which for its 
immigrants and refugees will greatly emphasize instruction on the province’s history 
and culture, as well as the Quebec’s society common values.  Although an ideal 
humanitarian refugee resettlement system would be imagined to yield high 
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resettlement numbers, and focus on both the economic and cultural adaptation of the 
refugee, as described by model 4, Lanphier found that such a model was simply not 
sustainable.  Rather, he found that a smaller volume of resettlement would better 
allow for a focus on either economic adaptation (such as is the case for the Canadian 
and French resettlement programs) or on cultural adaptation (such as is the case with 
Quebec’s resettlement program).  With these models, Lanphier argues that refugee 
resettlement programs become instrumental in shaping a state’s broader social 
policies.92    
 
Canada’s focus on economic integration and its lower intake of refugees for 
resettlement described by Lanphier in 2003 thus goes in line Lippert’s observation in 
1998 of the Canadian resettlement program having moved towards being more of an 
advanced welfare system, focusing on lower, but manageable numbers, and 
prioritizing swift economic integration of the incoming refugees, through personalized 
services offered by a range of organizations outside of the governmental system.   
 
However, would such a description accurately describe the Canadian resettlement 
today, focusing more on the economic integration, rather than the cultural integration 
of its resettled refugees?  The author would argue more emphasis would be placed 
today on the cultural integration of refugees, and of all other types of migrants, in a 
similar way than what had been done in the province of Quebec.  Quebec’s system 
being more focused on the cultural integration its of new migrants, in practice, has, 
over time, focused more than other regions of the country on the refugees’ language 
skills (French language skills in the case of Quebec), as well as increasing new 
migrants’ knowledge of Quebec politics, history, and culture.  With the entry into 
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power of the Conservative government at the federal level in 2006, similar objectives 
have been voiced by CIC Minister, Jason Kenney, concerning new migrants’ civic 
responsibility to learn one of the two official languages, and to expand the level of 
knowledge on Canadian history and politics that would be necessary to succeed in 
their Canadian citizenship examination.93  Economic integration, then, has come to be 
seen as insufficient.  Migrants of all categories, including refugees, are now expected 
by the Canadian Government to fully blend into their new society.   
 
Could this also mean a shift from an integrationist, to an assimilationist immigration 
system in Canada?  These few past decades of the government’s laisser-faire 
approach, which devoted limited funding to SPOs and put pressure on these 
organizations to encourage migrants to become independent from public assistance 
and enter the labor market and as quickly as possible, may now bring the government 
to realize that swift economic integration may not be sufficient.  It is insufficient, 
according to the Canadian government, if migrants are found to not have learned a 
sufficient level English or French that would allow them to work at an equivalent 
level on the job market than what they experienced in their countries of origin – work 
deemed equivalent to their level of education and previous work experience.  It could 
also be considered insufficient if the refugee is not able to attain a certain level on the 
job market in order to perhaps bring to the economy at least the equivalent in the 
public funds invested in his or her resettlement to Canada.    
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Finally, regarding resettlement numbers, Cochetel94 reported that Canada determined 
its resettlement capacity to be of 6,140 GARs for 2008 (representing 0.018% of its 
population95).  This was in comparison to the U.S.’s determined capacity of 50,000 
(representing 0.016% of its population96), and Australia’s capacity of 6,000 
(representing 0.028% of its population97).   The global resettlement capacity of all 
receiving countries combined thus amounted to 69,610 refugees in 2008.  Cochetel 
stated that although the number of resettlement countries and their allocated 
resettlement spaces were increasing, it still did not match the current resettlement 
needs of the world’s refugee population, as per UNHCR’s assessment of global 
resettlement needs.  He also warned that the gap between resettlement needs and 
states’ declared capacities was likely to increase.  As mentioned above, the 
resettlement needs of Iraqis alone were assessed by UNHCR to be of approximately 
60,000 in early 2009.  
 
Thus, in light of these authors’ observations and findings, the author aimed to 
document more current views and perspectives – from the Canadian government 
itself, and related non-governmental partners and individuals – on the Canadian 
resettlement system as it is today.  As resettlement was seen as more of a key durable 
solution before the 1990s, much more writing could be found on this topic before this 
date, while considerably less in the 1990s and thereafter when voluntary repatriation 
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and local integration became the preferred solutions to refugee crises.  Resettlement 
operations, however, are still associated with considerable costs invested by receiving 
states, in comparison to the funds allocated to the implementation of the two other 
main durable solutions.  
 
A number of questions, however, are not addressed by previously cited authors.  
Beyond the determination of a yearly resettlement ceiling, the interest of this thesis 
was to reveal more in-depth details about how Canadian resettlement policies are 
initiated, developed, and implemented.  The meeting evidence of the Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration relating to Iraqi refugees available on the 
Parliament of Canada website showcases how different groups come to advocate and 
defend their perspective relating to the cause of Iraqi refugees.98  However, what is 
not related in these public materials is how the Committee will come to a particular 
conclusion on, in this case, the Iraqi Refugee situation, how this conclusion is 
conveyed to the CIC Minister and others, and how the views of the committee affect 
the policy-making process relating to Iraqi refugees.  The questions asked to those 
interviewed were: what is influencing the Canadian government to resettle the number 
of refugees, and more particularly the number of Iraqis, it chooses to resettle every 
year?  Is the government most influenced by UNHCR’s assessment of the Iraqis’ 
needs for resettlement?  How is the level of funding for resettlement determined every 
year, and what proportion of these resources will be allocated to the resettlement of 
Iraqi refugees?  How are policies shaped with reference to all refugees resettled to 
Canada?  What about Iraqi refugees in particular? 
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Prior to commencing field research, it was the author’s observation that the reactions 
of the Canadian general public (expressing different opinions through public media 
such as the newspapers, radio, television, etc.) and of the local and international NGO 
representatives to a high or low level of overall refugee intake, or the intake or a 
specific refugee group, will often play a critical role in how resettlement policies are 
shaped.  The strength of these reactions may be due to the possibility that the 
Canadian policy-making process, in this case relating to Canada’s resettlement of 
refugees, may lack some clarity, and perhaps even transparency.  The aim of this 
research is thus to take a close look at the process of policy-making relating to refugee 
resettlement in Canada, and at the various sources of influences – economic, legal or 
humanitarian, and political – that shape these policies, in order to attempt to illuminate 
the opacity that seems to be attached to them, and to the policy-making system 
relating to the resettlement of refugees to Canada.   
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Over the course of the research for this thesis, the author sought to understand the 
process of policy-making in relation to the Canadian Refugee Resettlement Program, 
and more specifically, to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees.  One of the goal of the 
research was to describe and help all actors’ understanding of each other’s vision of 
the program, what they understood to be the program’s goals, and the means to reach 
these goals.  One of the end goals of the author was to increase the conciliation 
between these actors’ visions, and in turn attempt to have all major actors work in a 
roughly common direction, for the benefit of those in need of protection on a global 
scale.   
 
To understand this process, the initial aim was to look into the following categories of 
possible influences on this policy-making process: legal and humanitarian influences, 
economic influences, and international and domestic political influences.  While 
considering these influences, it was important to better understand the policy-making 
process involved in determining yearly resettlement quotas and ceilings, most 
particularly regarding the Iraqi refugee population since 2003.  
 
Clarification was obtained on the types of influences on the Canadian resettlement 
program through Internet research, and by interviewing concerned actors in Canada.  
These actors were considered best to be able to offer expert perspectives and opinions 
on the topic at hand.  Although some of the data collected was obtained from 
anonymous actors in the field who were knowledgeable on the research topic, the 
main informants for this research were:   
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1- Ms. Debra Pressé, Director of the Resettlement Division, Refugees Branch, 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa 
2- Mr. Michael Casasola, Resettlement Officer, UNHCR Ottawa 
3- Ms. Glynis Williams, Member of the Canadian Council for Refugees and 
Director of Action Réfugiés Montréal 
4- Ms. Grace Wu, Refugee Coordinator, Amnesty International-Canada, Toronto 
5- Mr. Jalal Saeed and colleagues, Iraqi Federation of Refugees, Toronto 
6- Mr. Moayed Altalibi, Iraqi Community Centre of Montreal 
 
PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES 
MS. DEBRA PRESSÉ, DIRECTOR, RESETTLEMENT DIVISION, REFUGEES BRANCH, CIC, 
OTTAWA, CANADA , INTERVIEWED 15 JULY 200999 
 
Establishing contact with Ms. Pressé 
Ms. Pressé was initially introduced to the author in January 2009, through 
professional networking.  Her contact was obtained through previous professional 
contacts from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and 
Migration.  Contact with Ms. Pressé was re-initiated in the summer of 2009 in the 
context of this research project.  Ms. Pressé was identified as a potential interviewee 
interviewed in the context of this research as she was considered to be a key expert, 
with regard to her direct involvement in the policy-making process relating to the 
Canadian Refugee Resettlement Program. 
 
Interviewee’s profile 
Ms. Pressé is a very knowledgeable contributor in her field.  On many instances in the 
context of this research project, as well as in the author’s socio-professional 
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networking process, Ms. Pressé’s name was mentioned along with comments that 
indicated a considerable level of respect for her knowledge on, and dedication to, 
Canada’s refugee program, as well as global refugee issues.  The comments received 
about Ms. Pressé were always indicative of the fact that although the Minister of 
Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism did not seem to prioritize the 
protection of refugees and others in need of protection, that to the contrary, Ms. Pressé 
and other government staff within CIC were found to strongly support the cause of 
refugees, and do everything in their power to make the best of the Canadian Refugee 
Resettlement Program, with the resources made available to their Division.   
 
Ms. Pressé offered a wealth of information on the functioning of the resettlement 
program, and made sure to address all of the questions presented.  The input provided 
by Ms. Pressé is that of a civil servant to the Government of Canada; although Ms. 
Pressé was able to provide a good amount of information on the topic at hand, she was 
of course limited to disclose only information she felt could be presented in the public 
arena.  At one point, the interviewer was asked by Ms. Pressé to turn off the recorder, 
where Ms. Pressé passed on speculative information regarding a particular budgeting 
decision that had yet to be confirmed.  
 
Other CIC representatives abroad were also considered, such as CIC Damascus.  
However, after interviewing Ms. Pressé, it was felt that the information received was 
all that would be made available on the part of CIC (considering usual part-lines 
offered by governmental departments), and that further exploration within this 
governmental department would not bring more insight into the topic at hand.   
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It was thus because of the limitations faced by Ms. Pressé as a government 
representative that it was decided to obtain the perspectives of other actors in the field, 
in order to attempt to draw a more complete picture of the different influences on the 
refugee resettlement policy-making process in Canada. 
 
MR. MICHAEL CASASOLA, RESETTLEMENT OFFICER, UNHCR OTTAWA, CANADA, 
INTERVIEWED ON 15 JULY 2009100  
 
Establishing contact with Mr. Casasola 
Previous contact had already been made with Mr. Casasola in the process of 
professional networking.  Mr. Casasola was keen on meeting and providing all 
necessary background information.  Preliminary research showed that UNHCR played 
a central role in Canada’s process of policy-making relating to all refugee issues, and 
that Mr. Casasola was the main interlocutor between UNHCR Ottawa and CIC, the 
CCR, and other stakeholders.  
 
Context of interview and nature of UNHCR-Canada relationship 
The interview with UNHCR was the only one out of the six interviews carried out in 
the context of this thesis research for which permission to record the interview was 
denied by the interviewee.  It was sensed that the UNHCR representative was very 
wary of possibility that statements made could be used out of context, and thus 
compromise UNHCR’s delicate diplomatic relationship with Canada, or more 
specifically with CIC. 
 
The nature of the relationship between UNHCR and the Government of Canada was 
made evident when UNHCR explained why they had not clearly stated the need for 
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Canada to increase the resettlement of Iraqis, and to increase the overall funding for 
refugee assistance on a global scale.  In relation to Canada, and it is also assumed, in 
relation to other major donors, UNHCR can only but demonstrate gratitude for their 
voluntary contributions.  Considering the principle of state sovereignty, and the fact 
that refugee resettlement or any other humanitarian initiative is voluntary, UNHCR 
considers it is not easily possible for them to express that Canada’s contributions may 
not be sufficient.  Rather, there can be only a respectful mention of the fact that 
further contributions from the Government of Canada would be greatly appreciated.  
 
UNHCR has thus very little room to maneuver with regards to its relationship to 
Canada.  This seems to often be the case not with Canada, but with many or most 
countries where UNHCR is considered merely as a guest, and must thus walk a very 
thin diplomatic line in the context of its interactions with the host state.  Despite this 
context, UNHCR’s relationship with Canada was still qualified as very positive by 
both UNHCR and CIC.  Casasola was thus speaking to the author as a loyal 
representative of UNHCR, and a loyal partner to CIC, and therefore had even less 
liberty in expressing his views than did Ms. Pressé from CIC.  However, Casasola still 
offered a valuable perspective of context that framed Canada’s policy-making with 
regards to resettlement. 
 
MS. GLYNIS WILLIAMS, CCR, ACTION RÉFUGIÉS MONTREAL, AND FORMER ICMC 
DEPLOYEE TO UNHCR SYRIA, INTERVIEWED IN MONTREAL, CANADA, INTERVIEWED 
ON 28 JULY, 2009101  
 
Establishing contact with Ms. Williams 
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The author was initially intending to interview the Executive Director of the Canadian 
Council for Refugees (CCR), Ms. Janet Dench.  Due to Ms. Dench’s unavailability at 
the suggested interview date, the author was referred to Ms. Williams instead. CCR 
was initially expected to be a key organization to interview in the context of this 
research, due to the fact that it is one of the main and largest advocacy groups in 
Canada concerned with refugee protection and asylum issues.  CIC considered that 
CCR rarely missed an opportunity to remind them of their obligations, of refugees’ 
and asylum seekers’ rights, and of highly vulnerable individuals or groups in the 
world who would be in need of Canada’s assistance.  It was therefore considered 
essential to interview CCR in the context of this thesis research, in order to potentially 
obtain contrasting perspectives on the subject. 
 
Profile of Ms. Williams 
The interview with Ms. Williams generated unforeseen benefits: she appeared before 
the Standing Committee for Immigration and Citizenship in 2008, along with the 
former president of CCR, to appeal to Canadian Government to raise its level of 
commitment to the alleviation of the Iraqi refugee crisis.  Her long-standing 
membership to CCR, her role as the director of Action Réfugiés Montréal (ARM), and 
her experience in the joint UNHCR-ICMC (International Catholic Migration 
Commission) Resettlement Deployment Scheme in Syria in the spring of 2007, made 
her a key expert on the research topic.  These organizations and initiatives are 
described below.   
 
CCR is “a non-profit umbrella organization committed to the rights and protection of 
refugees in Canada and around the world and to the settlement of refugees and 
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immigrations in Canada.”102  Described by CIC as its watchdog,103 CCR is always at 
the forefront of all refugee issues in Canada in particular, and routinely sought by CIC 
and the Canadian media to offer its perspective on any given issue relating to refugee 
protection or immigration.  However, CCR is considered by CIC to be mainly an 
advocacy group that may not represent the views of the public, while member 
organizations and individuals consider CCR as an essential entity, without which the 
voices of the refugees would not be heard, and their rights and dignity not respected.  
ARM, on the other hand, is a non-profit organization associated to the Anglican 
Diocese of Montreal, and one of few organizations in the province of Quebec 
involved in private sponsorship of refugees.  Lastly, the UNHCR-ICMC Resettlement 
Deployment Scheme, is a UNHCR-initiated program meant to help respond to the 
important staffing needs related to the process of interviewing and referral of refugees 
to various resettlement countries.104  ICMC deployees such as Ms. Williams work 
along side direct staff of the UNHCR to assist with various aspects of UNHCR 
Missions’ operations.  Williams worked with UNHCR Damascus as a resettlement 
officer, interviewing Iraqi refugees to determine whether they could be referred for 
resettlement to various countries.   
 
With all these associations, Ms. Williams represented a key source of information in 
the context of this research project.  She had first hand experience with Iraqis in Syria, 
as well as with resettled refugees and asylum seekers in Canada.  She thus also had a 
thorough understanding of UNHCR’s refugee resettlement system, as well as of the 
PSR program in Canada.   
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In her different roles and capacities, unlike Ms. Pressé from CIC and Mr. Casasola 
from UNHCR, Williams did not have any concerns about disclosing any particular 
type of information or perspective.  She was able to offer the most wide-reaching and 
‘uncensored’ opinions and observations relating to the questions at hand.  Although 
CCR is generally critical of decisions and policies of the Canadian government 
relating to refugees, Williams, although critical as well, demonstrated a broad 
understanding of the system, of the issues at hand, and of the misconceptions held by 
different actors placed at different levels in the system.   
 
MS. GRACE WU, REFUGEE COORDINATOR, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL-CANADA, 
TORONTO, CANADA, INTERVIEWED ON 20 JULY, 2009105  
 
Establishing contact with Ms. Wu 
The author was initially referred to Amnesty International-Canada by CCR.  CCR 
suggested meeting with Ms. Gloria Nafziger, a Refugee Coordinator for AIC known 
for her knowledge on Iraqi refugee issues, especially after participating in a fact-
finding mission to the Middle East, and visiting Palestinian-Iraqi camps near the Iraqi-
Syrian border.  However,  Nafziger not being available on the suggested interview 
date, one of Nafziger Amnesty colleagues, Ms. Wu, spoke to the author.  AIC was 
expected to offer a perspective that would be between that of CCR and UNHCR – 
more moderate than that CCR’s, although less constrained than UNHCR’s.  
 
Profile of Ms. Wu 
Ms. Wu was not as well informed on Iraqi refugee issues as originally hoped.  AIC is 
generally not involved in resettlement, other than when the situation is considered to 
                                                           
105 Wu, G. (2009). Interview with the author on 20 July 2009.  Toronto.  [Digital recording in 
possession of the author] 
 42 
be an emergency, such as was the case for the Iraqi refugee population, on which Ms. 
Nafziger would have been more knowledgeable.  However, Ms. Wu was able to share 
her knowledge on the general responsiveness of Canadian government workers, and 
lack thereof of Canadian politicians with regards to issues touching refugee 
resettlement or the rights of those in need of protection.     
 
Wu was in a similar position than UNHCR’s Casasola, in that she had to remain 
discrete in the expression of her views, considering that these could later be used to 
misrepresent the larger Amnesty International organization.  AIC’s relationship with 
the Canadian government seemed more delicate than that of CCR and CIC, although 
less than that of UNHCR and the Canadian government.  Wu’s words seemed to be at 
time calculated, although she did not hesitate to express her views about the current 
Minister’s, or the current government’s resistance to listen to appeals relating to those 
in need of protection and support.   
 
MR. MOAYED ALTALIBI, IRAQI COMMUNITY CENTER OF MONTREAL (ICC), CANADA, 
INTERVIEWED ON 28 JULY, 2009106 
 
Establishing contact with the ICC 
The ICC was located through the Internet.  The aim of interviewing the ICC was to 
gather the perspective of the Iraqi community in Canada regarding the Iraqi refugee 
crisis, and Canada’s response to it, or lack thereof.  Mr. Altalibi was the former 
president of, and current consultant for, the ICC.   
 
ICC profile 
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The ICC was founded in 1986, and was working at a very low profile at the time due 
to the fact that most Iraqis were fearful of Saddam Hussein’s regime, even while 
residing permanently in Canada.  They knew that if they were known to help regime 
dissidents, refugees, or asylum seekers, this would put them and their families in Iraq 
at risk.  However, since the fall of the regime in 2003, the centre was revived, and has 
been involved in the private sponsorship of Iraqis to Canada, as well as in providing 
services for government-assisted Iraqis arriving in Montreal.   
 
Concerning the fears of the community towards the previous Iraqi regime, Mr. 
Altalibi considered that a good number of Iraqis are still afraid to use their real names, 
and still afraid of the remaining elements of the regime.107  Altalibi himself came to 
Canada as an economic migrant, and has been established in Canada for over 20 
years.  Contrary to others in Montreal’s Iraqi community, he did not fear reprisals on 
himself or his family based on his involvement within the Iraqi community in Canada, 
and his organizations’ assistance to Iraqi refugees.  Altalibi was thus very candid 
about his opinion on the Iraqi situation, and on his perspective of whether Canada was 
meeting its obligation towards the Iraqi refugee population.  
 
IRAQI FEDERATION OF REFUGEES (IFR), TORONTO, CANADA, INTERVIEWED ON 20 
JULY, 2009108 
 
Interviewees 
• Mr. Jalal Saeed, President of the IFR 
• Mr. Hassan Mashkoor, Member of IFR and Board of Directors of the Iraqi 
Canadian Society 
• Ms. Lina Alipour, IFR receptionist, secretary, and researcher 
                                                           
107 Ibid., 0:01m; 0:03m. 
108 Iraqi Federation of Refugees (IFR). (2009). Interview with the author on 20 July 2009.  Toronto.  
[Digital recording in possession of the author] 
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Establishing contact with the IFR 
Mr. Jaleel’s contact information was also passed on to the author by the CCR.  Upon 
arrival at the meeting, two other IFR members demonstrated their interest in 
participating in the interview.    
 
Profile of the IFR 
The IFR was originally founded in London, United Kingdom, in 1991, while the 
Canadian branch was established in 1995.  The main activities of the Canadian branch 
at the time were mostly to support the international federation in its campaign to 
advocate in the interest of Iraqi refugees in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey.109  The 
main objective of the IFR in Canada today is to appeal to the government or to 
different organizations to help Iraqi refugees, and to support the Iraqi population in 
Canada. IFR is a self-funded organization, working only with volunteers, and is the 
first Iraqi community organization in Canada that supports solely Iraqi issues. It is 
also involved in private sponsorships, assisting the Iraqi community in preparing and 
submitting PSR applications.110  
 
The IFR is thus regularly approached by the Canadian media regarding questions such 
as how Iraqi resettlement numbers can be increased, and why Canada is taking less 
Iraqis than the United States, among others.111   
 
The three IFR interviewees did not have uniform perspectives.  Mr. Saeed’s position 
was that the Canadian government was not resettling enough Iraqi refugees, and that 
                                                           
109 IFR. Ibid. 0:01-0:02m. 
110 Ibid., 0:03m; 0:05m; 0:07m; 0:09m. 
111 Ibid., 0:15m. 
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the few who were resettled were not sufficiently supported by Canada – financially 
and otherwise.  On the other hand, Saeed’s colleague, Mr. Mashkoor, felt that Iraqi 
refugees do not need to be resettled in greater numbers.  Rather, he felt that they 
should remain as much as possible in the region, in order to be able to easily return 
when Iraq’s security situation stabilizes.  It was evident that the interviewees had not 
consulted each other much or at all regarding previously communicated research 
questions, and regarding the possibility of presenting a unified voice.  Mr. Mashrook’s 
position was that the Canadian refugee program could serve a useful purpose for only 
a small number of refugees in desperate situations, and that for the most part, all 
resettlement programs – Canada’s and others’ – were used by individuals who were 
more economic migrants than individuals in desperate need of protection.  Mashrook 
felt that Canada’s support would be better placed if it was invested in the Iraqi 
infrastructure and economy, in accelerating the rebuilding of Iraq, improving the 
general situation of Iraq, and thus allowing the Iraqi refugee and expatriate population 
to return.  A mass population return sometime in the future, in his perspective, would 
be ideal, and would only seem possible if the bulk of the Iraqi refugees remain in the 
Middle East region.  
 
INTERVIEW GUIDES 
Interviewees were presented with a set of questions that were developed specifically 
according to their expected fields of expertise (see Appendix).  
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Although interview consent forms were not used in the context of the research for this 
thesis, the author gave the interviewees the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of 
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their statements used in the thesis before its submission.  Four interviewees took this 
opportunity and requested for the author to modify, add, or remove some of their 
statements.  Some of these requests were due to some inaccuracies in the statements, 
which may have occurred in the process of the transcribing the interview notes and 
recordings.  Other requests were based on the fact that the interviewees did not wish 
for their statements to be included in the thesis, for fear that these could become 
public, and potentially negatively affect their work.   
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CHAPTER 3: CIC RESETTLEMENT POLICIES AND THE CASE OF IRAQI 
REFUGEES: FACTORS IMPACTING THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES TO BE 
RESETTLED TO CANADA 
 
FOUR POLICY PILLARS OF RESETTLEMENT112,113 
 
The Canadian government’s decisions related to its yearly resettlement targets are said 
to be mainly based on the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the 
Canadian government’s humanitarian objectives, the protection needs of refugee 
populations or of populations in refugee-like situations, as identified by UNHCR, and 
on UNHCR’s capacity and resources in the potential target source countries or 
countries of asylum.114  
 
Four policy pillars guide the global resettlement community – i.e., the resettlement 
states, and UNHCR – in their assessments and decision-making process.  These policy 
pillars are: the use of resettlement as an individual protection tool, resettlement as a 
possible mechanism to share global responsibilities, resettlement as a durable solution, 
and finally, the strategic use of resettlement, a more recent pillar only beginning to 
gain traction, and being particularly supported by Canada.115,116  
 
1- Resettlement as an individual protection tool 
CIC considers resettlement first and foremost as an individual protection tool used for 
refugee persons or refugee groups in situations of serious physical risk.  UNHCR will 
generally urge all resettlement countries to select the most vulnerable individuals, 
                                                           
112 Pressé, D. Ibid., 0:33m. 
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such as those whose lives are at risk, and those who have critical levels of physical 
protection needs. 
 
2- Resettlement as a durable solution 
In the majority of the cases, resettlement will be offered to individuals who would not 
otherwise have access to a solution that could end their state of asylum.  Such possible 
durable solutions include permanent integration to the country of asylum, or a return 
to the individual’s country of origin.  Assessing whether resettlement is the only 
durable solution available to the individual is one of the main components of the 
assessment conducted by UNHCR, and later by Canadian immigration officers.  In the 
case of the PSR program, the CIC officer will be the one determining whether 
resettlement is the only durable solution available to the applicant, after determining if 
the individual meets the refugee definition, and can be admitted to Canada under the 
full responsibility of his or her private sponsors.  
 
3- Strategic use of resettlement 
Resettlement is also used by Canada and its resettlement partners as a strategy to 
alleviate some of the numerous outcomes of refugee crises.  In 2003, the international 
community defined the strategic use of resettlement as resettlement activity leading to 
planned direct and indirect benefits accruing to refugees not being resettled. Thus, the 
strategy does not attempt to resettle as many refugees as possible, but rather, to 
resettle specific portions of a given refugee population in order to derive benefits for 
the non-resettled refugees of the same caseload in a given camp, city, or country.  
Resettlement can be used to reduce the pressures on a given country of asylum, and 
encourage these asylum countries to keep their borders open to future refugee flows.  
Resettlement operations in such circumstances also potentially allow for a larger 
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number of refugees to benefit from previously over-strained resources in the place of 
asylum, and also perhaps encourage other resettlement countries to begin or increase 
their own resettlement operations.  This strategy aims to make of resettlement an 
effective and efficient tool for the benefit of all parties concerned – the countries of 
resettlement, the country of asylum, and the refugee populations themselves.117  
 
Canada has been a promoter of the strategic use of resettlement.  It continues to 
support the ideas set out in the Multilateral Framework of Understandings on 
Resettlement, including the strategic use of resettlement, and seeks out opportunities 
to apply them.  In addition, Canada has also been focusing on addressing Protracted 
Refugee Situations through this strategy.118 
 
The strategic use of resettlement, as it was originally intended, was notably applied in 
the contexts of Nepal, Thailand, as well as in the case of the resettlement of a group of 
Somali refugees residing in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya.  Upon the initial proposal 
of the latter resettlement project by UNHCR, Canada and Australia committed to 
resettling all members of the one specific Somali clan.  This clan had been facing on-
going and targeted persecution in the camp; the limited resources available at the 
camp were thus absorbed by the extensive efforts made to protect and attend to the 
members of this specific group.  Although Canada in this instance only resettled 600 
persons, when added to the resettlement commitments of Australia, this strategy 
succeeded in allowing for more individuals to benefit from the limited camp services 
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118 Casasola, M. (2010) Email communication to the author. 
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available, and for the UNHCR protection officers to have more time to focus on other 
vulnerable persons residing in the camp.119    
 
4- Resettlement as a way to share responsibility 
One of the foundations of the Canadian Refugee Resettlement program is the principle 
of responsibility sharing.120  Canada aims to use resettlement to alleviate the human 
and financial costs, as well as the pressures of refugee influxes on major asylum 
countries’ economies and infrastructure.  It is the main reason why Canada committed 
to resettle Iraqis out of the Middle East, Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran, the 
former Soviet Union (and others especially since 2004121), and the Colombians since 
1988.  
 
Based on this principle, the plight of Colombians’ is considered to be one of Canada’s 
most pressing responsibilities in terms of refugee protection.  This is especially 
considering the fact that Canada will systematically plead for European countries to 
accept refugees from their own region.  CIC thus confirmed that “it is incumbent upon 
us to take Colombians” in the spirit of responsibility sharing, and considering the fact 
that Colombian refugees constitute the largest displaced population in the Western 
hemisphere.122 
 
Canada thus prioritizes strategies that alleviate refugee situations worldwide, such as 
through its membership to a working group on resettlement, and its involvement in the 
                                                           
119 Pressé, D. Ibid., 0:05m. 
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121 UNHCR. (2004). UNHCR – Afghan refugees leave Kyrgyzstan for new life in Canada, 
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resettlement of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, and of the Iraqi refugees in the Middle 
East.123   
 
Another context in which resettlement was used to share responsibility was in Turkey.  
While Turkey ratified the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, it has retained the 
geographical limitations of Article 1B(1) of the Convention, which only committed it 
to accepting refugees whose fear of persecution originated from events that occurred 
on European territory.  According to the country’s 1994 Asylum Regulation, Turkey 
will only grant temporary asylum to non-Europeans who meet the 1951 refugee 
definition while they await resettlement to a safe third country.124  The Turkish 
government thus accepts to leave its borders open to more asylum seekers, under the 
condition that other countries such as Canada accept to resettle some of the 
Convention Refugees on its territory.125  
 
Perspectives on CIC’s claims relating to responsibility sharing 
Some of those interviewed felt that Canada was in fact not accomplishing its fair 
share, considering most particularly the fact that Sweden had managed to resettle 
more Iraqis than both Canada and the U.S. combined.126  Some felt that if Canada did 
carry its fair share, it was only in certain circumstances: either in situations that 
seemed highly expedient, or where operations were initiated by the UNHCR.  A 
special UN-led initiative, however, did not automatically imply Canadian 
involvement; Canada at times would choose to opt-in or opt-out of UN-led 
resettlement operations.  Canada may act independently from UNHCR through the 
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resettlement of PSRs, an activity that does not require the presence of UNHCR or of 
any resettlement operation in the given country of asylum.127   
 
Application of the four policy pillars of resettlement in relation to Iraqi resettlement 
It is partly with the strategic use of resettlement in mind, as well as with the principle 
of responsibility sharing, that UNHCR appealed to resettlement countries to partake in 
the large-scale resettlement of Iraqis in the Middle East.  Considering the size of the 
Iraqi refugee population, which stood at approximately 2.5 million in 2007, the 
strategy consisted in resettling only a portion of this population, in order to keep 
neighboring countries such as Syria and Jordan open to receiving more asylum 
seekers.128  
 
When compared to the countries hosting the largest numbers of the world’s refugee 
population, however, it was felt that Canada was not assuming its fair share of 
responsibility with regards to the global refugee population, and that between 2003 
and 2007, more should have been done for Iraqi refugees on the part of Canada.  It 
was four years after the onset of Iraqi crisis that UNHCR officially concluded that the 
refugee flow would not be temporary.  Until this assessment was made, UNHCR’s 
strategy was one of containment, where it would not promote resettlement, in order to 
avoid a pull factor to the countries of asylum where resettlement would be taking 
place, nor would it encourage voluntary return, due to the worsening security situation 
in Iraq at the time.129  
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Thus, during this period preceding the beginning of major UNHCR resettlement 
operations in 2007, private sponsors in Canada had submitted a number of cases to be 
considered for resettlement.  Cases that seemed to meet the criteria were denied 
resettlement by CIC.  When some of these cases were submitted to CIC for 
reconsideration after 2007, many were approved.  It was assumed that CIC officers 
interviewing from Damascus and other locations in the Middle East region must have 
been aware of the situation in Iraq itself, and of the growing tensions and pressures in 
the countries of asylum.  Considering this, it was felt that criteria for inadmissibility, 
such as temporary reavailment, were strictly applied by overseas visa officers prior to 
2007 to support the rejection of these cases.130  It was thus felt that Canada could have 
found different avenues to be more generous and open, and that its lack to do so 
demonstrated a lack of political will.131   
 
CIC’S ESTABLISHMENT OF RESETTLEMENT PRIORITIES 
 
Sixteen countries worldwide have refugee resettlement programs with yearly quotas, 
which together make a total of 79,000 resettlement spaces available yearly.132  In 
contrast, UNHCR has assessed that over 500,000 individuals yearly are in situations 
of asylum where resettlement would represent their only possible durable solution.  
Considering this gap between resettlement needs and resettlement spaces made 
available, potential receiving countries must make their own assessment of which 
individuals will be considered as priority in the context of their resettlement 
program.133  
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Table 2: CIC’s Past Resettlement Priorities – Top Ten 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Afghanistan        17% 
Colombia            14% 
Sudan                  11% 
Afghanistan        23% 
Colombia            16% 
Sudan                    9% 
Colombia            18% 
Afghanistan        18% 
Ethiopia                9% 
Afghanistan        18% 
Myanmar            16% 
Colombia            15% 
Iraq                   20% 
Colombia            15% 
Afghanistan        13% 
Ethiopia                8% 
Iraq**                 6% 
Iran                       6% 
Ethiopia                8% 
Iraq                     5% 
Liberia                  4% 
Sudan                    7% 
Iran                       5% 
DR Congo            5% 
Iraq                     9% 
Ethiopia                7%    
Somalia                 6% 
Myanmar              8% 
Ethiopia                8% 
DR Congo            7% 
DR Congo            5% 
Somalia                4%  
Liberia                 3% 
DR Congo            4% 
Somalia                 3%  
Iran                       3% 
Myanmar              5% 
Somalia                 4%  
Iraq                     4% 
DR Congo            6% 
Eritrea                   4% 
Sudan                    3% 
Somalia                 6% 
Eritrea                   5% 
Iran                       3% 
Sierra Leone         3% Tajikistan              2% Thailand               3% Iran                       3% Sudan                    3% 
Other                   22% Other                   23% Other                   24% Other                   13% Other                   12% 
10,526 10,400 10,663 11,152 10,804* 
 
Obtained from CIC. (2009a). Resettlement – One Durable Solution in the Global Refugee Protection 
Regime, Presentation for the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, June 2009, p.15. 
*Projected numbers  
** Emphasis on Iraq data added by the author 
 
Sixty-nine different nationalities of refugees were resettled by Canada in 2008.  For 
2009, Canada prioritized for resettlement the Iraqi, Bhutanese, and Colombian 
populations, expecting to receive approximately 3,900 Iraqi refugees from Syria and 
Jordan, 1,300 Colombians from Colombia and Latin America, 1,000 Bhutanese 
refugees from Nepal, 3,600 African refugees from the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes 
region, Cairo and Pretoria, and 2,000 from the rest of the world, for a projected total 
of 11,800 globally.134  In order to establish these priorities, CIC had to consider its 
previous commitments, as well as its limited budget. 
 
Necessity to consider previous multi-year commitments  
Regarding GARs, in 2007, Canada had committed to resettling 5,000 Bhutanese 
refugees by 2012.  As the first selection team of CIC officers arrived in Nepal in 
September 2008, the first Bhutanese arrivals in Canada only started occurring in 
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2009.135 Canada had also in the past committed to resettling close to 4,000 Karen 
refugees from Thailand.  Just over 3,900 were already selected by Canada, and most 
had already been resettled by the end of 2008.  However, nearly 900 of these Karen 
refugees who were scheduled to be resettled by December 2008 had not yet arrived to 
Canada.  These delays had been due to local floods, coups d’état, airport sit-ins, and 
other such sources of instability occurring in Thailand at the time.  The end of 
resettlement operations for the Karen group in 2008 would have translated into the 
increased availability of resettlement spaces for other groups in 2009.  Instead, 
however, most of these 900 Karen refugees were to be resettled in 2009, and some 
even in 2010.136  
 
In addition to Canada’s previous commitments to resettle the Bhutanese and the 
Karen, Canada also committed to resettling a number of asylees in Turkey.  As 
explained above, resettlement from Turkey was strategic: major resettlement countries 
had agreed to resettle some of its asylum seekers, in order for Turkey to keep its 
borders open to more potential refugee movements.  Many Iraqis referred by UNHCR 
in Turkey to Canada had already been interviewed and selected by the middle of 2009, 
and were due to be resettled in Canada sometime in 2010.137  
 
Influence of CIC’s establishment of priorities on the resettlement of Iraqis  
As can be noted in Table 1 below, the resettlement of Iraqis was considered to be one 
of CIC’s priorities since 2004, although they only began to be resettled in greater 
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numbers in 2008.  Iraqis were actually the top resettlement priority for Canada in 
2008, as well as in 2009.138 
 
In 2009, Canada committed to resettling over a 3- to 4-year period a minimum of 
12,000 refugees out of its embassy in Syria, with at least 2,500 persons being selected 
per year under the PSR program.  The vast majority of these refugees were Iraqis.  
This was a considerable increase in allocated spaces to privately sponsored Iraqis 
given that they will be allocated 7,500 spaces over this period, out of a total 9,900 to 
13,500 spaces allocated to PSRs globally during the same period.139  
 
For CIC to meet its commitment of 5,000 Bhutanese to be resettled by 2012, more 
than 1,000 had to be resettled in 2009, 2010, and 2011.  This yearly 1000 individuals, 
combined with the multi-year commitment to Iraqi refugees (4,500 over three years), 
thus represented a large portion of the usual yearly resettlement target of 
approximately 7,500 GARs.140 
 
Limited budget, limited capacity: prioritizing cost-effectiveness 
The budget for the resettlement program, determined by Parliament, was left at the 
same level since 1998.  It is for this reason that the total number of GARs admitted to 
Canada has hovered around 7,500 over the last few years.141  Considering the limited 
budget put to its disposal, CIC’s Resettlement Division devised a pragmatic and cost-
effective approach.  It first recognized that it is simply much more cost-effective when 
both GAR and PSR caseloads are processed in one same location, rather than only 
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GARs or only PSRs being processed by a single mission.  The cost-effectiveness of a 
potential selection mission of GARs, PSRs, or both, will thus usually be one of the 
main factors determining whether this mission will be carried out.  Although the 
Karen refugees in Thailand and Bhutanese refugees in Nepal have only been resettled 
to Canada through the GAR program,142 these groups were resettled in large numbers 
by a range of resettlement countries, which also made the selection missions and 
resettlement operations more cost-effective.  
 
As described previously, an increase in resettlement numbers in one region or of one 
population would therefore necessitate a decrease in resettlement numbers for another 
population, in order to not exceed the maximum number of individuals that can be 
admitted to Canada yearly, with the allocated resources.  It was felt, however, that 
these shifts of priorities had traditionally been done by the government at the cost of a 
decrease in resettlement from the continent of Africa, while for the Middle East, for 
example, humanitarian emergencies were often making the news headlines.143  
Although GAR numbers were decreased by Canada in some regions, PSR space 
allocations were eventually increased. Such a shift was also in line with the objective 
for the program to be cost-effective, in that the cost of the PSR program is mostly 
absorbed by the private sponsors, while that of the GAR program is covered solely by 
the government.       
 
Compared to all other types of migration, refugee processing is the most complex and 
expensive.  While, generally, applications for immigration to Canada are processed 
without the occurrence of in-person interviews, this is not the case for refugee cases.  
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Refugees must either travel to the nearest CIC mission abroad, or when this is not 
possible, CIC officers must travel to the refugees’ locations.  When the processing of 
refugees must take place in camps, it may take the CIC selection team a few days to 
get to the refugees’ location, and another few days to return.  Such journeys on the 
continent of Africa, for example, may also entail traveling through minefields.  In 
such cases, CIC must also invest in security staff, UN escort guides, and cover the 
cost of rentals for UNHCR armored vehicles, among other expenses.  Considering all 
these factors, a selection team may only be sent to such a location when the refugee 
caseload is large enough to make the mission more cost-effective.144  
 
However, the in-Canada support of refugees is said to represent far more in terms of 
costs, compared to the costs of overseas processing.  In fact, out of the Resettlement 
Assistance Program (RAP) budget, 75% will go directly to GARs in the form of 
income support, while the other 25% will be transferred to the SPOs to finance 
services for the resettled refugees.  Despite these costs, the RAP budget is still 
considered to represent the bare minimum needed.145 
 
In addition, the Immigrant Loan Program, covering the cost of refugees’ transport to 
Canada and of the medical assessment fees incurred abroad, is an amount that must be 
repaid by the refugees within approximately 6 years of their arrival.146  Although such 
a loan program is implemented by Canada and the U.S. in order to save on their 
program cost, every other resettlement country absorbs these costs on behalf of the 
                                                           
144 Pressé, D. Ibid., Part B, 0:08-0:09m. 
145 Ibid., Part A, 0:33m; Part B, 0:12-0:13m. 
146 CIC. (2009d). Resettlement 101, Presentation by Maryka Nichols, CIC Refugees Branch, in the 
context of In-Canada Canadian Orientation Abroad Refugee Facilitators’ training, Ottawa, Canada, 03 
Nov 2009. 
 59 
UNHCR-referred refugee. 147  In the recent past, a number of other organizations from 
different sections of public services appealed to the government to eliminate the 
loans’ policy, such as anti-poverty groups, children advocacy groups, and settlement 
organizations working with newcomers, all linking the loans to disadvantaged youth, 
and extended years of struggle and living beneath the poverty level.  They argued that 
this loan was of such magnitude, especially for individuals being resettled to Canada 
with nearly nothing, that it often created a insurmountable burden on the refugee 
individual or family, pulling them or keeping them away from any chance of being 
financially self-sufficient, or being able to concentrate on language classes long 
enough to reach a level necessary to access middle to upper-range job markets.148 
 
If the resettlement program would see an increase in budget, it would thus be most 
beneficial to all those resettled if the loan program were eliminated and the RAP 
budget increased, rather than resettling a greater number of individuals that would 
receive minimal support upon arrival.149 
 
Cost-effectiveness in the case of Iraqi resettlement 
Being resettled to Canada through both the GAR and the PSR programs, Iraqi 
refugees are therefore a good example of an effective use of resources.  The 
processing of Iraqis is also perhaps slightly cheaper compared to other groups, 
considering the fact that most, if not all Iraqis in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, 
are urban refugees living in the asylum countries’ capitals. 
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Prioritizing border control and security 
Numerous sources felt that it is not the lack of overall resources of the Government of 
Canada that is the problem, but rather, its establishment of priorities.  The current and 
previous governments have long claimed having limited resources to dedicate to the 
refugee resettlement and asylum systems, while they have continually allocated 
considerably sized budgets and resources to other initiatives such as interdiction, 
imposition of visas, or other types of measures that result in denying individuals in 
need of protection the ability to reach Canada and make an asylum claim.150  
 
Box 1: Migration Integrity Officer Program  
For Canada, interdiction refers to the practice of denying individuals in possession of 
improper documentation access to the country.  Migration Integrity Officers (MIO) 
are employees of the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), who are placed “in 
46 key foreign embarkation, transit, and immigration points around the world.”151  
Global MIO staff counts 56 individuals.   They are involved in the interdiction of 
approximately 5,000 individuals per year, and in the facilitated entry to Canada of 
3,000 individuals yearly, most of the latter being Canadian citizens returning to the 
Canada.152  The Migration Integrity Officer program was developed in the context of 
Canada’s Multiple Borders Strategy, described as a strategy “focusing its intelligence 
and interdiction efforts on each of these [overseas] checkpoints in order to keep 
inadmissible and potentially harmful individuals as far away from North America as 
possible. […]  Passenger analysis units [are] established at Canadian airports to 
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identify high-risk travellers before they arrive, thus enabling CIC to identify criminals 
and security threats earlier in the travel continuum.”153  
 
Some believed that the Refugees Branch of CIC is not getting the portion of the larger 
budget that it should, i.e. portions that are being dedicated in favor of other priorities, 
rather than to the selection of individuals in need of protection.154   
 
Influence of security concerns on Iraqi resettlement to Canada  
In the case of Iraqis specifically, the government as well as the media were concerned 
with potential security issues tied to this group, and implemented more thorough 
security measures within resettlement program for Iraqis as a result.  Some Iraqis in 
Canada considered these increases in security measures related to resettlement as 
completely legitimate, considering the complexities in detecting individuals with more 
ill intentions and less legitimate protection needs.155 
 
Influence of Canada’s humanitarian tradition on resettlement  
Canada’s refugee resettlement program is also driven by its long history of receiving 
refugees from the time of the Second World War, to the intake of tens of thousands of 
Vietnamese Boat people, and of many other groups thereafter.  Canada, the United 
States, and Australia have long histories of sponsorship-like programs, past and/or 
current, that are similar to the current PSR program.  
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Others felt that due to its geography, Canada had always had the capacity to be 
selective, unlike other countries surrounded by refugee-producing countries.  In the 
midst of growing discourse that divides refugees resettled from overseas from asylum 
seekers who select Canada as their country of asylum, some argued that Canada 
exercised its capacity to be selective at the cost of denying asylum seekers their right 
to protection from persecution.156,157 
 
Canada’s tradition of resettling Iraqis 
Canada also has a long history of taking Iraqi refugees since the beginning of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, much before the 1991, 1998, and 2003 wars, and subsequent 
refugee outflows.158  This tradition may have worked in favor of Iraqi resettlement, 
due to Canada’s familiarity with this population, as much as it could have worked 
against this group, due to the host community’s perception that Iraqis may be less in 
need of support than other groups that may appear to be more vulnerable. 
 
Use of the Source Country Class program only when feasible  
The Source Country Class program consists of processing individuals in refugee-like 
situations who may be internally displaced and experiencing persecution based on one 
of the five grounds defining a Convention Refugee, with no other durable solution 
available to them within a reasonable period of time.159  
 
Although six countries appear on Canada’s Source Country Class list (Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, El Salvador, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, and 
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Colombia160), processing under this program is currently only possible in Colombia.  
This is due to the fact that the Colombian government has been highly cooperative 
with Canada in order to facilitate the resettlement of a portion of its population, unlike 
the five other countries listed.161  When deciding whether to initiate in-country 
processing, CIC must thus consider whether it would be safe – or even possible – for 
CIC officers to be able to regularly access the processing location without 
endangering themselves, or the refugee applicants they are aiming to assist.162   
 
Possible application of Source Country class program in Iraq  
Iraq does not figure on Canada’s list of possible locations for Source Country Class 
processing both due to the fact that the Canadian government does not have any 
official presence or diplomatic mission in Baghdad, and to the fact that Iraq is not 
considered by Canada to be a sufficiently safe country for visa officers to routinely 
travel to or for applicants to travel to a given processing location.163  Only Iraqi 
citizens who are in Iraq and who wish to have an immigration case processed while 
they are still residing in Iraq can file an application with the Canadian Embassy in 
Damascus, and travel to this location for interviews, medical assessments, and other 
related formalities.164 
 
Considering the security situation in Iraq that is not expected to greatly improve in 
near future, it is unlikely that Iraqis still in the country could be considered under this 
category. 
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‘Likeliness to successfully establish’ criterion 
One of the criteria to be considered in the Canadian resettlement selection process is 
an applicant’s potential to successfully establish himself or herself in Canada.  More 
specifically,  
applicants must show potential to become self-sufficient and successfully establish in 
Canada within a 3 to 5 year time frame.  Factors such as education, presence of a support 
network (family or sponsor) in Canada, work experience and qualifications, ability to 
learn to speak English or French and other personal suitability factors such as 
resourcefulness will be taken into account by visa officers.  However, this criteria does 
not apply to refugees determined by a visa officer who fall within the categories: ‘urgent 
need of protection’ or ‘vulnerable’.165 
 
Both refugees admitted under the [Urgent Protection Program (UPP)] and those 
determined by a visa officer as vulnerable are not required to demonstrate an ability to 
successfully establish in Canada.166  
 
Although this criterion exists, it is said to be applied so softly that it would be very 
difficult (though not impossible) to deny a case on this basis alone.   
 
INFLUENCE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELECTION PROCESS ON IRAQI RESETTLEMENT  
 
For Iraqis in particular, this criterion would have never or rarely come into 
consideration during the process of selection, likely due to Iraqis’ generally strong 
educational and professional backgrounds, and thus to their high likeliness of 
successfully establishing in Canada.167  In cases where high needs individuals could 
not demonstrate their potential ability to quickly successfully establish, however, 
Canada’s resettlement selection guidelines calls for the application of a ‘sliding scale’, 
where higher protection needs would require less of a need to demonstrate the 
successful establishment criterion.168  
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Although this criterion did not seem to be applied in the case of the Iraqi caseload, 
there was a concern with the fact that is was ever applied at all. It had been observed 
that an informal scale is still being used by CIC to assess applicants’ potential ability 
to successfully establish despite the fact that the application of such a criterion does 
not agree with the principals of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.169 Although 
UNHCR has asked for Canada to completely remove the criterion, Canada has only 
done so on an official level.170 
 
Absence of a resettlement program for urgent medical cases  
Since the implementation of the 2002 IRPA, although individuals presenting severe 
medical conditions can still be denied resettlement to Canada if they potentially 
present a threat to the Canadian population (either a medical threat, or a physical 
threat in the case of a mental health issue that could make an individual susceptible to 
harming others), refugees can no longer be found inadmissible if they necessitate 
excessive medical care, and/or if this medical care can potentially represent excessive 
costs.171  However, Canads’s system does not allow for the resettlement of urgent 
medical cases.  
 
The spirit of the Canadian resettlement program would indicate that Canada would 
ideally prioritize high needs medical cases.  However, Canada’s main challenge in 
implementing a resettlement program that would allow for the admission and 
settlement of urgent medical cases to Canada is the fact that refugee resettlement is a 
federal jurisdiction, while Canadian health care is of provincial jurisdiction.  To make 
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such a program possible, the federal and provincial governments would have to create 
a coordinated program, which would allow UNHCR to refer high-needs medical cases 
to Canada in a swift manner, and allow for the appropriate care would be dispensed 
upon the refugee’s arrival.  However, due to this governmental structure, it is hard to 
imagine that such an effective program would ever be possible to implement in 
Canada.172   
 
The Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) program is said to be an effective option to 
resettle high-needs cases – medical or other – if other avenues are not available.173  
The JAS program is a combination of the GAR and PSR programs, where individuals 
receive government assistance (RAP) during two or three years, depending on the 
extent of the needs, but also have a SPO mandated to provide supplemental guidance 
and moral support to this individual.174  However, Canada is said not to have adequate 
resources available to deal with highly traumatized persons.  SPOs in Quebec were 
reported to being left to themselves to deal with such cases, with little information 
being made available prior to the resettlement of these high-needs individual, and 
inadequate networks and resources to provide these individuals the services they 
require.  Although the jurisdiction of such services is provincial and that the level of 
support offered to other JAS cases in the rest of the country is likely to vary,175 the 
problem seems to be omnipresent across the country.176 
 
Influence of the absence of an effective resettlement program for high needs cases on 
Iraqi resettlement  
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The Iraqi population has a very high and increasing incidence of severe health 
conditions.  In fact, it was reported that Iraqis suffered of cancer and other severe 
sickness at uncommonly high levels.177  Although the new provisions included in 
Canadian law since the 2002 IRPA at least exempt some cases from being denied 
resettlement to the potential high cost of their medical care once in Canada, or to the 
nature of their condition, Iraqis who have conditions that may require urgent medical 
attention will simply not be referred by UNHCR to Canada, due to the absence of a 
system to receive and adequately treat these individuals illnesses.  
 
International conventions and 2002 IRPA 
The 2002 IRPA defines the rights that both GARs and PSRs are now entitled to.  The 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, incorporated into the 2002 IRPA, will not only 
affect Canada’s actions relating to its own resettlement and asylum systems, but it will 
also affect its choice of responsibility-sharing duties.  For example, if a country is 
signatory to the Convention, Canada will not normally accept a refugee referral from 
this country, as it will expect this country to exercise its own responsibility-sharing 
duties by granting asylum to the individual.  However, Canada will accept referrals 
from Kenya, Thailand, and South Africa, among a few others.  In the case of South 
Africa, although this country has signed the Convention, Canada has accepted to 
resettle some of its asylum seekers.   This is due to the fact that South Africa is still in 
the process of building its own refugee determination system, for which Canada 
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provided technical expertise and support.  To assist with South Africa’s backlog, 
Canada accepted to assist in this country’s efforts to meet its humanitarian goals.178   
 
However, it was felt that Canada was failing on many levels to meet its legal 
obligations in relation to the protection of refugee populations, notably in terms of 
statelessness.  While Canada has signed the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, it has not yet signed the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, which is considered to be the most significant one.  As the latter 
Convention had not been signed, and therefore not incorporated into Canadian laws, it 
does not provide stakeholders the appropriate tools to protect the rights of stateless 
persons and to find a remedy to their situation.179  Canada is said to have had many 
opportunities to ratify the 1954 Convention.  However, the fact that Canada has not 
yet acted on the issue was seen as a sign that the goodwill and good intentions of 
Canada were simply absent regarding the needs of stateless persons.180  In sum, it was 
felt that Canada will almost always seem like it is meeting all its obligations, however, 
it often does not, especially when it feels that it is meeting its most basic and pressing 
obligations.  It is also feared that UNHCR is too accepting of the image that Canada is 
projecting – one of a true humanitarian country with excellent programs, in land and 
overseas.  When it comes to having the opportunity to truly commit to measures that 
may effectively protect all refugees, it is felt that Canada fails, with regards in 
particular to stateless persons,181 high needs medical cases, women at risk, or even 
persons referred under its own PSR program who are not admitted, despite seemingly 
appearing to meet all the criteria necessary to be granted resettlement.     
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The case of Iraqi Palestinians  
It is felt that the ratification of the 1954 Convention would give Canada and other 
stakeholders more tools to attempt to find durable solutions for stateless persons such 
as the Palestinians.  In the meanwhile, however, the PSR program is considered to be 
of particular value due to the fact that it could be used to resettle Palestinian 
refugees.182  Although it was understood from the perspective of some of the 
interviewees that Canada could have resettled under the GAR program Palestinians 
who formerly resided in Iraq, it was felt that Canada decided to resettle them only 
under the PSR program (through the process of Visa Office Referrals – VORs) in 
order to avoid a possible backlash from Canadian-based groups that may be known 
not to favor the interests of Palestinians.  It was felt that the Canadian government 
could more easily resettle this group under the PSR program, instead of through the 
GAR program, where individuals would have been entirely taken charge by the state.  
In 2009, Canada thus began to resettle under the PSR program Palestinian refugees 
who had fled Iraq in 2006, and had since been residing for the most part in Al Hol 
Camp, Syria, and a few in the nearing camp of Al Tanf,  Many more Palestinians 
remain, however, in these camps and in many others across the Middle East.  
Although without the incorporation into Canadian law of more provisions that would 
support the rights of stateless persons, there is little hope to find a solution to their 
endless state of asylum,  
 
Influence domestic law and federal-provincial sharing of responsibility  
According to Canadian legislation, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and 
Multiculturalism must declare to Parliament on November 1st of every year how many 
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individuals, by category, will be admitted to Canada within the following year.  This 
is referred to as the ‘levels plan’.183  As immigration is one of the only two issues 
under the Constitution Act for which federal and provincial governments have formal 
shared jurisdiction,184 every year, high-level discussions regarding immigration occur 
at the Ministerial level, at the Deputy Minister level, with each province, and then as a 
collective.  Provincial governments thus have a highly influential voice with regards 
to how many individuals of each immigrant category will be admitted to their 
territory.  Once provinces determine how many immigrants they are in a position to 
take, the number of refugees they will receive will be a specific proportion of their 
immigrant intake.185 
 
Influences of the International Community on Iraqi Resettlement  
In 2009, the international community considered that Iraqis constituted one of the 
groups in most urgent need to be resettled and to merit international concern.186  In the 
context of the policy-making process relating to resettlement, Canada will routinely 
look to other countries of resettlement, exchange on how the resettlement community 
as a whole can participate in collective efforts to alleviate particular refugee situations.  
CIC is also in daily communication with its missions abroad, in order to have a more 
accurate picture of how potential or ongoing refugee situations are developing.187  In 
the situation of the Iraqis, the delay in initiating resettlement operations for this group 
indicates that Canada was notably looking to other resettlement countries to define its 
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own course of action.  Although the missions in the region of the Middle East must 
have been aware of the situation on the ground and an apparent need for action, other 
factors and influences evidently superseded.     
 
INFLUENCE OF UNHCR ON CANADA’S RESETTLEMENT POLICIES AND OPERATIONS 
 
Canada works very closely with the main implementer of the Convention and Protocol 
relating to status of refugees, UNHCR.  UNHCR’s mandate is notably to identify 
those most in need of protection through resettlement.  CIC is invited to Geneva thrice 
yearly to attend UNHCR meetings along with other resettlement countries, and to 
meet with UNHCR bilaterally as well.  In the context of these meetings, Canada will 
participate in finding effective strategies to alleviate the impacts of refugee 
movements on all those concerned.  UNHCR’s proposals for action have a 
considerable influence on the policy-making process related to the Canada’s refugee 
program, and on the strategies adopted by Canada to share the international burden of 
refugee crises.  Canada is known to follow UNHCR’s lead, and to seek guidance from 
UNHCR on which groups are in need of resettlement worldwide.188,189  
 
UNHCR’s appeals and statements of priorities in relation to Iraqis  
Prior to 14 February 2007, UNHCR’s protection strategy for Iraqis did not involve 
promoting resettlement, though it did not oppose resettlement or any migration 
solution for individuals if they were able to find such a solution on their own.  They 
appealed to the governments of the main countries of asylum in the Middle East to 
respect the principle of non-refoulement, thus to allow them access to their territory, 
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and not to return refugees to their country of origin under any circumstance.190  
UNHCR advised Canada and other potential resettlement countries to keep the Iraqi 
population in the region at the time.  Thus, by not implementing resettlement prior to 
2007, Canada was simply following UNHCR’s directive to this effect.191 
 
An announcement was then made by UNHCR and the U.S. Department of State on 14 
February 2007.192  In this statement, where the United States announced its 
commitments to alleviate the Iraqi refugee crisis, U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees António Guterres emphasized the main issues at stake: the plight of the 
estimated 1.8 million internally displaced people within Iraq, and that of the estimated 
2 million Iraqi refugees residing mainly in Jordan and Syria.  Mr. Guterres reiterated 
that resettlement could not be the solution for all Iraqis, especially considering the 
limited number of resettlement spaces that were available globally.  The priority was 
therefore to make sure that the current needs of the refugee population were met in 
their countries of asylum.  Mr. Guterres urged the international community to provide 
support to Jordan and Syria, whose economies and infrastructures had taken a 
considerable toll due to the mass influx of Iraqis since 2003.  Another major concern 
was the impending risk of the general population of these countries to turn against 
Iraqis, thus putting the security of this refugee population, of the entire region, at a 
high risk.  UNHCR also appealed to the international community to resettle some 
20,000 Iraqis globally. 193  
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Some Iraqi PSR applications that had been previously denied by Canada were later 
approved when resubmitted after UNHCR’s appeal.  However, in principle, the PSR 
program should not be influenced by any of UNHCR’s assessments of global 
resettlement needs.  Rather, Canadian visa officers are to make individual refugee 
status determinations, regardless of the existence of other types of resettlement 
programs for a given refugee group.  To approve a PSR case, CIC needs only to look 
at whether an applicant’s persecution story is based on one of the five grounds 
outlined in the 1951 Convention, and whether the applicant is eligible and admissible.  
Although no official directive was necessarily given by Canadian authorities to deny 
these cases before the time of UNHCR’s resettlement appeal, no directive was known 
to have been given to apply inadmissibility criteria less strictly.194  
 
UNHCR’s assessment of resettlement as a durable solution 
At the time of its appearance before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and 
Immigration, UNHCR informed the Committee about a survey commissioned by 
UNHCR in Syria, which showed that only 4% of the surveyed Iraqis in asylum in 
Syria had plans to return to Iraq.  Out of these, only 31% were planning to return to 
Iraq within one year following the survey, while the others did not have a date in 
mind.195  UNHCR was attempting to demonstrate that the problems facing Syria and 
the Iraqi population they were hosting were not about to disappear, and could very 
well worsen with the increasingly strained state of the Syrian infrastructure, and 
possibly of additional refugee flows into the country.  
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Although there was a considerable amount of lobbying done in 2003 and 2004 in 
favor of resettlement of Iraqis to Canada, this was said not to be enough to drive the 
Canadian government to resettle large numbers of Iraqis at the time.196  The fact that 
Canada did not elect to resettle a greater number of Iraqis before 2007-2008 was 
simply because UNHCR was not referring Iraqi refugees prior to this period.  In the 
context of all large-scale refugee movements, UNHCR’s immediate concerns are 
always to cater to the population’s most basic needs: provide physical protection 
through their Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process and the distribution of 
legal documents, set up health services and food distribution systems, set up and 
maintain refugee camps, etc.  UNHCR’s strategy is that resettlement operations 
should only begin a few years after onset of a refugee crisis, when it can be better 
assessed whether the situation in the country of origin will not be improving within a 
reasonable period of time, i.e. within 5 or 6 years.  However, resettlement may be 
implemented earlier in situations where extra asylum space could be created in a 
country of first asylum, to allow for more individuals to seek temporary refugee, or in 
contexts where the asylum countries are experiencing unsustainable pressures on their 
infrastructure or other.197   
 
In August 2007, in view of the deteriorating security situation in South and Central 
Iraq, UNHCR issued new guidelines stipulating that Iraqis from these regions should 
be considered as prima facie refugees.198  The issuance of these guidelines 
strengthened UNHCR’s appeal made earlier that year, which called for the 
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international community to prioritize the resettlement of Iraqis, especially those from 
the regions identified by UNHCR as least stable and secure. 
 
Initiating mass resettlement operations for Iraqis 
In 2007, UNHCR appealed to other countries planning to begin resettlement 
operations for Iraqis to increase their commitments.  UNHCR’s appeal was felt to be 
of most urgent nature, due to the fact that at the time, the estimated number of Iraqi 
individuals who were expected by UNHCR to be in need of resettlement was 
considerably larger than the number of spaces the resettlement community had yet 
committed to globally.199 
 
During this same period, a Canadian delegation traveled to Jordan, Syria and Turkey 
to meet with representatives from the U.S., Australia, and UNHCR to explore the 
ways in which Canada could help alleviate the Iraqi refugee crisis, and how the 
resettlement community as a whole could offer an effective remedy to situation.  The 
delegations also came together to assess the number of individuals who would be in 
need of resettlement, and how resettlement numbers could be divided amongst 
partnering resettlement countries.200  
 
The represented countries aimed to ensure that their actions would not be perceived in 
an ill manner by the countries of asylum, and that these actions would not risk further 
destabilizing the region in any way.  As such, it was felt that the resettlement 
operations needed not only to be of large scale, but also needed to be as equitable as 
possible, with resettlement targets spread across the region in a proportionate fashion.  
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Canada evaluated that as Syria was hosting the largest number of Iraqis, Canada 
should resettle the largest number of Iraqis from Syria; this was to be followed by 
Jordan, and then others.  Canada’s second and third priorities were to resettle 
individuals referred by UNHCR based on one the 11 vulnerability criteria, and finally, 
those whose cases would be submitted to CIC by private sponsors.201  The 11 
vulnerable categories identified by UNHCR specifically for the Iraqi caseload were:202 
1. Survivors of violence and torture 
2. Members of minority groups who are/have been targeting in their country 
of origin due to their religious or ethnic background203   
3. Women-at-Risk 
4. Unaccompanied minors 
5. Family reunification (i.e., dependants of refugees living in resettlement 
countries) 
6. Elderly Persons-at-Risk 
7. Persons with medical needs with no effective treatment available in the 
country of asylum 
8. High profile cases and/or their family members 
9. Iraqis who fled as a result of their association in their country of origin 
with the Multi-National Forces, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the 
United Nations, foreign countries, international and foreign institutions or 
companies and members of the press 
10. Stateless persons from Iraq 
11. Iraqis at immediate risk of refoulement 
 
The majority of the Iraqi cases referred to Canada have been referred under the 
categories of Legal and Physical Protection Needs, Survivors of Violence and Torture, 
and Women-at-Risk.204 (See Table 3) 
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Table 3: UNHCR Submissions and Departure of Iraqi Refugees to Canada by 
Criteria, 2007-2008* 
   
UNHCR submissions and departure of Iraqi refugees to Canada by criteria,         
2007 – 2008 
  2007 2008 
Criteria Sub Dep Sub Dep 
Women-at-Risk 290 32 397 93 
Children and adolescents     1   
Family Reunification 9  1   
Legal and Physical Protection Needs 567 72 743 201 
Medical needs 42 6 40 7 
Older (elderly) refugees 8 3 27 2 
Refugees without Local Integration Prospects 46 19 175 583 
Survivor of Violence and Torture 553 34 1,328 144 
Grand Total 1,515 166 2,712 1,030 
 
*Provided by M. Casasola, UNHCR, in an email communication to the author, July 2009 
 
UNHCR appeals, and the international communities’ response 
In 2007, UNHCR made three appeals to the international community: one at the level 
of US$ 123 million to be invested towards humanitarian assistance in Syria, another 
of US$ 129 million to support Syria’s education sector, and finally one of 
approximately US$ 85 million to address the urgent health needs of Iraqis in Syria, 
Jordan, and Egypt.  In the same year, Canada committed US$ 2.5 million towards 
UNHCR’s first appeal.  In 2008, UNHCR appealed for an additional US$ 261 million 
to be invested in assisting Iraqi refugees and displaced persons.  In response, Canada 
committed 1.5 million to this appeal.205  
 
UNHCR stated in the first part of 2008 that while the resettlement operations were 
well underway on the side of UNHCR, and that the organization had succeeded in 
significantly increasing its referral capacity in Syria and Jordan, the main concern had 
become the low rate of departures of Iraqis from their countries of asylum to their new 
countries of resettlement.  UNHCR thus urged the major resettlement countries, 
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including Canada to try to expedite the processes of selection and departures.  They 
also reiterated that between 80,000 and 90,000 Iraqi refugees in the Middle East were 
still considered by UNHCR to be vulnerable and in need of resettlement, and that as 
such, a far greater number of resettlement spaces were urgently required to meet these 
needs.  UNHCR also expressed concern at the time about the fact that only half of the 
value of the financial pledges made by international community had been received by 
UNHCR by early 2008, and that the received amounts did not represent enough to 
keep UNHCR’s programs for Iraqis operating during the second half of 2008.  
UNHCR thus called for increased and sustained financial contributions.  They also 
appealed to the international community for more bilateral support to Syria and 
Jordan, in order to alleviate the pressures on their strained economies and 
infrastructure.206 
 
Despite all of UNHCR’s appeals, and the agency’s hopes that the international 
community would respond positively, it is a state’s voluntary act engage in 
resettlement, as there is no existing right to request resettlement from a particular 
country.  UNHCR’s funding structure as set out by the General Assembly and its 
Executive Committee makes UNHCR reliant upon voluntary contributions of states, 
while only receiving a small amount of funding directly from the UN.207  Therefore, 
UNHCR could not grade Canada’s response to its appeals, but rather, it could express 
gratitude for what Canada had done and continued to do.  UNHCR could thus also 
only respectfully request that these actions continue, or that contributions be 
increased. 
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FACTORS LEADING TO DELAYS IN RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS 
 
UNHCR operations 
Although Canada committed to resettling several hundred Iraqis during the first year 
of these resettlement operations (approximately 400 or 500 GARs in 2007), these 
targets were not met.  The low resettlement numbers of Iraqis in 2007 was due to the 
fact that at this time, UNHCR was not yet running at its full capacity, in order to be 
able to deliver the large numbers of refugee referrals requested by all resettlement 
countries combined in time for them to meet their specific calendar or fiscal year 
targets.   
 
However, the Iraqi resettlement operations did represent the largest resettlement 
exercise in approximately 2 decades.208  In 2003, UNHCR was only referring for 
resettlement a total of 35,314 refugees globally.209  In contrast, when the resettlement 
operations for Iraqis began, 12,000 referrals had to be prepared by UNHCR for the 
United States alone.  It thus seemed reasonable that UNHCR took some time to gear 
up all of their missions in the Middle East, that some time was needed for a sufficient 
number of Iraqis to register with UNHCR, and that also much time was required for 
UNHCR to make sure that all referrals met the respective requirements of every 
resettlement country.  Regarding the latter, specific requirements included different 
types of medical examination procedures, different exclusions, different security 
check procedures, and so on.  Therefore, once UNHCR’s missions were running at 
full capacity, their output was said to be ‘phenomenal’.  Consequently, in 2008, when 
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the UNHCR referrals were flowing in, and the pressure on the United States continued 
to increase, Canada pledged to further increase its commitments.210 
 
CIC operations 
As mentioned above, the Canadian government had declared opening up PSR spaces 
for Iraqis in the hopes that private sponsorship organizations would have the capacity 
to meet this target.  However, the issue of resettlement capacity in the context of the 
PSR program was not one related to the capacity of the potential refugee sponsors.  
Rather, it was directly related to the limited capacity of the CIC office in Toronto to 
process the high number Iraqi PSR applications in this area – the area with the largest 
portion of private sponsors of Iraqi refugees – and to CIC’s slow reaction in finding a 
remedy to this issue of understaffing.211  Canadian government workers thus had 
considerable influence in the fact that this issue was not addressed in a timely fashion, 
thus slowing down the entire PSR process for Iraqi PSR cases submitted in Toronto in 
particular.  Although this instance may not necessarily demonstrate a bias of any kind, 
it simply shows how particular administrative procedures can have far reaching 
consequences for some individuals, such as those whose cases were delayed for many 
months due to this one issue.   
 
IRAQIS’ RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS 
 
The author was not able to obtain statistics on the religious profile of those resettled to 
Canada.  An applicant’s religious affiliation, or the ground(s) upon which a person 
was persecuted and found to be a refugee, are in fact not captured in CIC’s database, 
as such tracking would violate principles stipulated under the Canadian Charter of 
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Human Rights. Rather, the religious affiliation of an applicant would only be found in 
immigration officer’s notes in the applicant’s physical case file.  The only information 
captured in the database will be whether or not the individual was persecuted based 
one of the five grounds defining a Convention Refugee, whether the individual is 
referred as a Woman-at-Risk case, an individual in need of urgent protection, 
unaccompanied minors, and cases selected under the One-Year-Window program.212  
 
Perception regarding the favoring of Iraqi Christians 
The PSR program was observed to be essentially a Christian movement.  This was not 
to say that sponsors in Canada did not sponsor applicants of other religions, however, 
in the case of Iraqis, it was observed by the visa officers on the ground that Privately 
Sponsored Iraqis were almost 100% Christian.213 
 
Similarly, regarding UNHCR-referred cases, Christians Iraqis had long been over-
represented in the registered refugee population in Jordan and Syria, and that 
consequently, more Christians seemed to have been referred for resettlement 
worldwide.214  In fact, while Iraqi Christians represented less than 3% of the total Iraqi 
population,215 they represented approximately 14% of all Iraqi refugee registrations 
with UNHCR,216 and a large portion of all cases referred for resettlement.  To 
counteract this observed phenomena seemingly in favor or Iraqi Christians, UNHCR 
carried out mobile registration campaigns, notably in Syria.  Iraqi asylum seekers 
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would be approached in order for UNHCR to evaluate the needs of the population and 
better inform the delivery of direct services to the population, as well as to promote 
UNHCR registration for their own protection and for possible access to 
resettlement.217  UNHCR’s efforts in the resettlement operations for Iraqis thus 
seemed balanced and non-discriminatory in terms of the applicants’ religious 
backgrounds.  UNHCR’s main objective was really only to meet their targets for Iraqi 
resettlement referrals, which were higher than they had been in decades of global 
resettlement activities.  These targets were only hoped to be met by UNHCR, 
regardless of the religious profile of all of their referred applicants.218,219,220 
 
With regards to the PSR program, however, Christians may have also been resettled in 
greater proportion, simply because of the fact that the Iraqi population in Canada was 
predominantly Christian and that, like any other group, Christian Iraqis naturally 
tended to sponsor their own families, friends, or members of their own religious 
communities.221 
 
In addition, there had also been a considerable amount of pressure on the government 
from certain sections of the Iraqi community in Canada, but most especially from 
Iraqi Christians.  One problematic issue was that some of the Christian Iraqis in 
Canada genuinely feel that they represented the real Iraqi refugees, or the largest 
portion of the Iraqi refugee population.222  However, in reality, although they 
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constituted a considerable proportion of the referred cases, the clear majority of the 
entire Iraqi refugee population was of Muslim background.223  
 
It was also felt that the current Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and 
Multiculturalism, Mr. Jason Kenney, had his own bias in favor of the Iraqi Christians.  
He was reported to have visited a number of Iraqi Christian organizations during this 
period, which fueled this perception.  All Iraqis – no matter their religious 
backgrounds – had to do military service, and many individuals of all religious 
backgrounds were career military personnel.  It was thus a stark misperception that 
Iraqi Christians would not have any of the military triggers that would make them 
inadmissible for refugee resettlement, although this was a nuance felt to be either not 
understood or not clearly expressed by the Minister.224  
 
This bias was also interpreted through the fact that the Iraqi-Palestinians were only 
resettled under the PSR program, rather under the auspices of the public GAR 
program.  The arguments offered by the government to explain why these refugees 
were not considered under the GAR program were thought not to hold, and suggested 
that the government could in fact have resettled these refugees under the GAR 
program, if it had the political will to do so.225  Some concluded that resettlement of 
the Palestinian refugees under the PSR program was thus another indication of a 
noticeable bias on the part of the government in favor of the Christians, and in 
disfavor of all others.226 
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INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL POLITICS 
 
Influence of Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism and 
Parliament officials 
The current Minister of Immigration and Citizenship and the country’s Prime Minister 
were also felt not to be open to suggestions aiming to further assist refugee 
populations in general, such as increasing the yearly resettlement quota, rather than 
shifting resettlement numbers from region to region and maintaining a resettlement 
cap.  It was felt that the government’s actions or non-actions seemed to be mainly 
driven by politics, and that as such, many actors in the field had become particularly 
disheartened by the views and attitudes expressed by top political figures, as well as 
by their objective of drastically restructuring of Canada’s asylum system.227 
 
In 2008, the Secretary General of AIC spoke before the Standing Committee for 
Citizenship and Immigration and joined the CCR in its appeals to the government to 
prioritize and increase the resettlement of Iraqi refugees.  More specifically, he 
appealed to Canada to increase resettlement numbers for the Iraqi refugee populations 
in Syria and Jordan, and urged the government to urgently consider resettling the 
Palestinian refugees residing in Syria.228  It was felt, however, that AIC’s lobbying 
and advocacy regarding Iraqi resettlement had not been very effective on the political 
sphere, and that with the current conservative government in place, most particularly 
the current CIC Minister, not many of these issues were likely to move in the direction 
that AIC would have hoped.   
 
Policy-making decisions relating to refugee resettlement in Canada are officially 
based on Canada’s humanitarian objectives, refugee populations’ protection needs and 
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Canada’s available capacity, i.e. where can refugees be accessed safely, effectively, 
and efficiently.  However, these decisions are also clearly influenced by the political 
level of government, based on the elected officials’ consultations with their 
constituents.  To increase the resettlement budget, and thus to obtain funding from the 
central budget is a complex process which requires a policy shift, and choice that goes 
beyond a discussion in the House of Commons.229  This is where the influence of civil 
servants and elected officials could have some weight in the process of determination 
of a general direction for the resettlement program as a whole.  
 
Influence of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration  
One of the platforms on which stakeholders and political actors may pronounce 
themselves on this topic is in the context of the Standing Committee on Citizenship 
and Immigration.  
 
Box 2: The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 
With the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration following the Act 
of the same name in 1994, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration as 
it is known today was established.230  The mandate of this Committee is to:  
[examine] orders of references that the House of Commons refers to it.  Orders of reference may relate 
to bills, Estimates or order-in-council appointments.  The committee may also study issues of its own 
choosing.  In addition, the Committee studies and reports on all matters relating to the mandate, 
management and operations of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB).231   
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Members of the Committee are drawn from most (or all) parties represented in the 
House of Commons.  Those present in the context of the meetings on Iraqi refugees 
included 4 Members from the Conservative Party (including one of these members 
acting as the Chairman of the Committee), 4 Members and 1 Acting Member from the 
Liberal Party, 2 Members from the Bloc Québecois, 1 Member from the New 
Democratic Party, and 1 Associate Member from the Green Party.232,233,234  
 
The composition of the Standing Committee thus seemed balanced in terms of party 
representation, other than the Chair being a member of the ruling party. 
 
Influence of the Standing Committee hearings on Iraqi resettlement 
One of the suspected reasons for the increase of the target for Iraqi resettlement in the 
CIC mission in Syria, is the outcome of the Committees meeting on the issue of Iraqi 
refugees.235  Although individuals or groups may express interest in attending, 
members of the Standing Committee will decide whom will be invited to speak before 
them. Representatives of AIC, IFR, and ICC were all invited to attend to speak on the 
issue of the Iraqi refugee crisis over the course of meetings that took place from 
December 2007 to the middle of 2008.  It was understood that the Standing 
Committee, at the end of their consultations, formed recommendations that would be 
passed on to the CIC Minister.  However, it was unclear what level of weight these 
Committee recommendations had on the Minister’s decisions relating to budget 
allocations or programmatic considerations with regards to the resettlement of Iraqis.  
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Influence of civil servants on Iraqi resettlement 
Although the Minister has shown to be attentive to Iraqi Christians in particular, the 
civil servants working for CIC have demonstrated a more balanced perspective.  
Another sign that the civil servants within CIC were being driven by humanitarian 
concerns and true concerns for the protection of refugees was notably the facilitation 
of the resettlement of Palestinians-Iraqis from Syria.  Although this movement only 
took place under the auspices of the PSR program, it at least showed a willingness to 
push for the resettlement of the most vulnerable.236  It was thus felt that government 
workers were doing their best to make optimal use of the resettlement program in the 
interest of Iraqi refugees, within a certain frame of limitations.237  
 
Moreover, although Canadian decision-makers are strongly influenced by public 
pressure, the opinions of civil servants will also hold much weight in the decision-
making process. From their perspective, Canada needs to implement a program that 
meets the needs of the refugees who have been persecuted, regardless of their 
religious background or other elements of their profile, and that Canada should use 
UNHCR’s referral mechanism as the impartial system it is meant to be.  The program 
thus needs to be proportional and reflective of the vulnerable cases referred by 
UNHCR.238   
 
INLFUENCE OF PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP GROUPS  
 
To better inform their refugee resettlement policies, CIC consults with various 
stakeholders in Canada, such as the CCR, private sponsors, and others.  Private 
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sponsors were traditionally consulted by CIC to find out where they expected to 
sponsor refugees in the year to follow.  However, in 2009, CIC decided for the first 
time to consult private sponsors to find out where they believed public resources 
should be spent: regarding the perspective of the larger refugee and immigrant 
communities in Canada; their own assessment of refugee situations worldwide; their 
direct or indirect contact with refugee populations; and these individuals’ assessment 
of the whether a given refugee situation could be alleviated through resettlement.239  
 
Private Sponsors’ influence on Iraqi resettlement 
Despite the fact that there was not a considerable amount of lobbying on the part of 
Private Sponsorship groups, compared to others, Minister Kenney committed to 
making 2,500 PSR spaces available for Iraqis in 2009.  Considering that the total 
number of PSR spaces allocated by Canada worldwide was 4,500 for the same year, 
and that refugees from 39 different nationalities were resettled through the PSR 
program in 2007, spaces allocated to Iraqis represented a proportion of more than 50% 
of the program capacity, which represented a significant commitment on the part of 
the government.240  
 
However, it is felt that this prioritization of the PSR program over the GAR program 
caused a shift in focus for the resettlement program that veered away from prioritizing 
the assistance of the most vulnerable members of the Iraqi refugee population.  
Although all resettled refugees must meet the refugee definition, private sponsorship 
organizations will sponsor whomever they wish, i.e., not necessarily the most 
vulnerable, or the most in need of resettlement.  Rather, GARs are most likely to be 
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the most vulnerable, as they will have already been screened by UNHCR and referred 
for resettlement for this reasons of either high vulnerability, or in the case of the 
absence of other durable solutions.241  It was also observed that the idea that refugees 
should demonstrate a potential ability to successfully establish themselves in Canada 
is also common within the sponsorship community, who will naturally tend to bring to 
Canada individuals with whom they have ties with, and that they would be easily able 
to assist in their settlement process once they arrived.242  
 
INFLUENCE OF THE PUBLIC ON THE RESETTLEMENT OF IRAQIS 
 
While the Canadian public certainly had the situation of Afghanistan at the forefront 
of their minds considering the presence of Canadian troops on Afghan soil, this was 
slightly different in the situation of Iraq, where Canada did not participate in the war, 
or in the peacekeeping efforts.  In comparison to the United States, however, Canada 
seems to have the strongest public support regarding its refugee policies, while for the 
United States, the strongest supporters of the resettlement program are considered to 
be at the political level.  In order to maintain this public support, it is believed that 
Canada should continue to focus on resettling the most vulnerable refugees.  Although 
Canada should certainly not stop resettling those who seem to be in less dire need of 
assistance, it was simply observed the Iraqi refugee population had been considered 
have different set of needs in comparison to other groups currently or previously 
resettled by Canada, such as the Bhutanese, the Karen, or the Hmong.  Some SPOs 
have found it challenging to meet the expectations of Iraqis due to Iraqis having had a 
higher standard of living prior to the war.243  Thus, although Canada should of course 
continue to resettle all those in need of this type of protection, it should also make sure 
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to continue resettling those with greatest settlement needs, simply in order to retain 
public support for the overall program. 
 
Although it was felt that the one of the reasons for the increase in Iraqi resettlement 
targets since 2007 was the increase of public pressure,244 refugee resettlement was 
also found to be a hard sell to the public in the contemporary context.  One reason 
identified was that there were no clear and immediate benefits to receiving refugee 
populations.  One can compared today’s context to the 1950s, when Canada took 
approximately 40,000 Hungarians in the after the Second World War, and to the 70s, 
when large numbers of Vietnamese boat people were received in the context of the 
cold war.  In both these situations, the political motives seemed fairly clear.  However, 
in the case of Iraqis, the political motivation to resettle this population may not have 
been as clear-cut.  However, if the public did show alarming concern regarding an 
issue, politicians were found more likely to act in this direction.245 
 
In addition, when stories or issues hit the media, and were thus repeatedly brought to 
the attention of political actors, politicians are again forced to react.246  However, very 
few Iraqi stories were seen in the Canadian media at the time in 2007.  One of the few 
examples of the broadcasted stories was one of an Iraqi woman who was resettled 
from Syria, after a Canadian journalist had done a piece on her story while she was 
still in hiding in Damascus.  It felt that the story had particular impact partly due to the 
fact that the woman was fluent in English, and was thus able to clearly describe her 
situation and string of severe misfortunes.  Her ability to communicate in English may 
have thus enabled Canadians to relate to her in a more significant and direct manner 
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than if this story had been recounted through the voice of an interpreter.  After hearing 
the broadcast, a group of Canadian women who had never been involved in refugee 
sponsorship or advocacy sponsored this woman and her two children to Canada.  This 
story was aired sometime in 2007, at the height of public pressures on the government 
to increase its efforts to alleviate the Iraqi crisis, and was believed to have had an 
effect on the public’s level of interest in the Iraqi refugee issue.247 
 
Lobbying in favor of Iraqi resettlement to Canada  
In 2008, specific groups within the Iraqi community started lobbying at the Canadian 
ministerial level. The more vocal groups were the Asyrian community, the Chaldean 
community, but also other members of the general public.  According to CIC, public 
opinion must be taken into consideration by the Minister, and social action and grass 
roots movements are some of the most effective strategies to exercise influence on the 
policy-making process.  For example, if a politician is repeatedly approached by his or 
her constituents or congregation, he or she would inevitably develop a sense of 
obligation to actively listen, and act.  Thus, for individuals to call or write to their 
Members of Parliament does have an influence on the policies they are registering 
their input on.248 
 
However, while the voices of many regular citizens would be considered to have a 
considerable amount of weight in the eyes of politicians, some organizations who are 
often heard by the government are considered to be at times not as effective.  A lobby 
group may thus be considered to only represent this group’s view and interest, rather 
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than those of the public.249  Although CCR felt it was unfortunate that government 
held this opinion, they maintained that an organization such as CCR represented the 
best negotiating tool for individual members, and for small member organizations, 
most often taken up by their own refugee-aiding and other professional activities.  
Still, however, although CIC’s position with regards to interest groups was 
understood, it was felt that CCR’s call to action relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis did 
make a difference, especially in the context of the Iraqi refugee crisis, which was not 
tackled heavily by the media, but rather, by individuals working directly with Iraqi 
refugees on the ground.250   
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS 
 
At the outset of this research, the aim was to identify the different types of influences 
that shaped the policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis refugees to 
Canada.  Through desk research and interviews with different actors in the field, the 
author set out to better understand this process, and to fill in the gaps of knowledge on 
the subject which had not until now been evident in the literature.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to clarify the purpose of the Canadian government in 
implementing its resettlement program, which initially appeared to be highly costly, 
but yet also seemed to allow only for a minimal proportion of the world’s refugee 
population to be resettled.  The author questioned as well whether Canada managed to 
resettle only the most vulnerable refugees, which was understood to be one of 
Canada’s resettlement program’s original primary goals, and one of UNHCR’s 
primary goals in implementing resettlement as a durable solution to refugee crises.  
The reason for the particular timing and breadth of the resettlement of Iraqis to 
Canada from 2003 to the present was an object of specific interest.   
 
METHOLDOLOGY 
 
Choice of expert interviewees 
The sample of interviewees used in the context of this research allowed for an 
exploration of some of the factors shaping the Canadian refugee resettlement program.  
More varied data and perspective would need to be collected in order to arrive at 
farther-reaching and more conclusive findings.  The potential missing elements to this 
research could have been the uncensored perspectives, information, and data from the 
Minister and the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, from the Members of 
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Parliament, and from the government budget – all elements that were not available to 
the author in the course of this research.  Although the information and perspectives 
collected by the author were all valid in and of themselves, they remained for the most 
part the personal or institutional opinions in the case of all interviewees except in that 
of Ms. Pressé and Mr. Casasola.  While Pressé and Casasola only offered the facts that 
she was at liberty to share considering their positions within the governmental system 
or UNHCR, the others’ perspectives were based on some facts, as well as on 
insinuations of the government’s true intentions and priorities with regards to refugee 
resettlement, and on the interviewees’ personal vision of what the principal aims of 
the resettlement program should be.  
 
Interview structure 
As the author initially aimed to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of Canada’s 
resettlement program, some of the questions that remained in the interview guides 
resulted in the collection of much data that did not relate to the influences on the 
refugee resettlement program.  The most fruitful questions, however, were those that 
related directly to the topic, including the facts or personal perspectives on how the 
resettlement policy-making process takes place, as well as the main elements of 
consideration for the decision makers of the resettlement program. 
 
The author had also originally suspected that the influences could be separated in 
three categories:  economic influences, legal and humanitarian influences, and 
political influences.  It was found that although some of the influences could be 
categorized as such, most were more complex, and were closely related to other 
elements of the larger picture.  For example, this was the case for the economic 
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influence.  As explained by CIC, although the Resettlement Division will aim to 
invest the limited budget in a manner that will optimize the leverage of resettlement 
activities, this budget is highly influenced by political actors, who are in turn 
influenced by the Minister’s stated priorities, and where both the later and the former 
are notably influenced by voters’ opinions, among other numerous factors.   
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
A synthesis of the main factors and individuals influencing the policy-making process 
relating to the resettlement of Iraqis, and to the Canadian refugee resettlement system 
as a whole is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Thesis Findings in a Glimpse 
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CANADA’S HUMANITARIAN TRADITION VERSUS COST-SAVING PRIORITIES  
 
While Beiser had argued that the Canadian government’s wish to uphold its 
humanitarian reputation was one of the main reasons implementing its resettlement 
program, particularly its small scale, Neuwirth had referred to this approach as 
calculated kindness.251, 252  Basok, on the other hand, highlighted that Canada simply 
did not consider refugees as potentially positive contributors to the Canadian 
economy.  She argued that due to the fact that refugees could no longer be used as 
effective political leverage against states of opposing ideologies, refugees came to be 
seen as mere burdens to the receiving state.  Basok even felt that Canadian 
government greatly influenced the idea now rooted in the public arena that refugees 
are in fact disguised economic migrants whose possible intention is to take advantage 
of the Canadian welfare system.253  Casasola had added that the application of the 
‘ability to successfully establish criterion was a manner in which to reduce the weight 
of this burden, by attempting to resettle individuals who had the ability to rapidly 
integrate with limited assistance from the state.254 
 
Similarly, CCR and AIC felt that Canada was often accomplishing just enough to 
appear it was maintaining its humanitarian tradition, although not far beyond.  This 
was considered to be the case with the minimal support provided by Canada to high 
needs cases, who were at times brought to Canada expediently, but without adequate 
support and services made available to them upon their arrival to Canada.255,256  
UNHCR and ICC also considered that one of the main factors driving Canada to 
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resettle refugees was its humanitarian tradition.257,258 In fact, one of CIC’s officially 
stated aims is to maintain Canada’s humanitarian tradition, notably through the 
protection of refugees and others in refugee-like situation.259  However, it seemed 
evident when looking at CIC’s perspective that the main priority of Canada’s refugee 
resettlement programs was for the initiatives to remain effective.260  This aim could be 
interpreted as an indication of actual intentions, aiming primarily to maintain 
Canada’s humanitarian tradition and reputation, all by remaining cost-effective, rather 
than simply aiming to protect refugees and others in need due to national moral 
obligations.   
 
Stein had noticed a problematic conceptualization in the major resettlement programs, 
in their aims to become controlled and regularized, while refugee flows are neither 
ever controlled, nor regularized.261  Such a conceptualization demonstrated even more 
that the principal aim of a resettlement program, like that implemented by the 
government of Canada, is not to resolve refugee crises, nor to attempt to find the best 
manner to maximize the alleviation of refugee situations.  Rather, as highlighted by 
AIC and Williams, the aim would seem to lean more towards resettling some 
refugees, although not necessarily the most vulnerable, but only a sufficient number to 
appear to be resettling an appropriate volume that would indicate that Canada would 
be resettling selecting its fair portion of the world’s refugee population.  It also 
indicated the government’s priority to have a structure that would be easily 
manageable from a bureaucratic point of view, rather to construct a system that could 
first and foremost address the refugee crises effectively.  
                                                           
257 Altalibi, M. Ibid. 
258 Casasola, M., (2009). Ibid. 
259 CIC. (2009b). Ibid. 
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When also observing a decrease in the level of commitment of the major resettlement 
countries of the time to resettle large numbers of refugees, Stein notably attributed this 
to the increased unemployment rates in the main countries of resettlement. Although 
the recent world economic crisis only took place in 2009, the resettlement budget had 
not seen an increase in over a decade.  It was made clear by CIC in the context of this 
research that the ceiling of approximately 10,000 to 12,000 of refugees resettled to 
Canada yearly was only due to the limited budget.  CIC also explained that decisions 
to resettle refugees from one location or another were also mainly based on costs; 
Pressé described the factors involved in a possible refugee selection mission in a 
remote refugee camp in Africa.  She admitted that a group of refugees that would be 
closer to a CIC mission abroad would of course reduce the cost of processing, and 
thus allow for a greater number of refugees to be resettled sooner with the given 
budgetary allowance.  This was not to say that the refugees in remote locations would 
never be reached by CIC, but rather, that there would be a necessity to wait until the 
number of refugees was large enough to make a selection mission in this location 
cost-effective.    
 
In addition, CIC indicated that another major factor that guided Canada’s decisions in 
terms of resettlement targets was UNHCR’s existing capacity in the potential source 
country or country of asylum.  UNHCR’s capacity in a given country is directly 
related to its donors’ investments in a particular country office, or in a particular 
funding campaign.  In the case of a refugee movement in a country where none would 
have occurred before, or where UNHCR would not have had major activities in the 
past, Canada and other resettlement states would have to greatly invest in building the 
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capacity of UNHCR in the region, rather than being able to capitalize on existing 
infrastructure and human labor already on location.  Given the limited budget 
allocated by the Canadian Parliament to the resettlement program, CIC’s Resettlement 
Division also considered it necessary to try to capitalize, when possible, on previous 
investments that would have been done to increase UNHCR’s capacity.  It thus 
seemed more cost-effective, then, to initiate Canadian resettlement operations where 
UNHCR would either already have the capacity to provide a sufficient number of 
resettlement referrals, or for Canada to decide to embark on such an initiative with 
other states willing to collectively invest in building the capacity of the Agency in a 
given location, such as was the case for the resettlement of the Iraqis, the Bhutanese, 
and other refugee populations resettled in large numbers in the past. 
 
Saving costs in the context of the resettlement of Iraqis 
It is arguable whether the Minister’s decision to increase GAR numbers for Iraqis ever 
so slightly, while significantly increasing PSRs, was truly serving to meet the most 
pressing needs of the Iraqi refugee population, or whether it was only allowing for a 
group of a lucky few, rather than a group of particularly vulnerable individuals, to 
benefit from resettlement to a safe third country.  The resettlement of PSRs costs the 
government a fraction of the resettlement of GARs, due to the fact that private 
sponsors will cover what is generally covered by RAP – RAP representing the largest 
cost in the entire process of resettlement.  It thus seemed to be an obvious choice for a 
government seeking to meet its most basic obligations at lower costs to favor the 
allocation of spaces for PSRs, rather than for GARs.  
 
National security, at all costs 
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Although, of course, public programs must be liable to the individuals funding them, 
i.e. the Canadian taxpayers, and that taking this under consideration, the government 
must ensure to make its humanitarian programs efficient and effective, it was argued 
by Williams that these cost-saving principals are not applied consistently with regards 
to matters of immigration in particular.   Here, she referred to the seemingly cap-less 
budget dedicated to keeping individuals outside of Canada.  Williams brought to light 
the practices of interdiction implemented by the Migration Integrity Officers posted in 
strategic locations around the globe, who have as a purpose to notably stop potential 
asylum seekers abroad before they are able to make it to Canada to register an asylum 
claim.  Although she acknowledged that Canada must protect its borders and ensure 
the security of its citizens, she considered as unbalanced the amount of resources that 
were allegedly spent on interdiction activities around the world, and the fact that no 
significant efforts seemed to be invested in making these activities cost-effective.  It 
seemed, rather, that the protection of national security was seen as having no limited 
price.   Alternatively, the protection of refugees was considered to be an endeavor that 
could represent a risk to national security:  the protection from potentially fraudulent 
and ill-intended asylum seekers rather than the protection of asylum seekers truly in 
need was thus considered an activity worthy of a limitless budget.   
 
It should be highlighted, however, that no examples of costs related to the practices of 
interdiction were known by the interviewee, nor was the author able to locate details 
on the budget allocated to Canada’s MIO program.  Nevertheless, one could still argue 
that certain political motives and priorities may at times trump the aim to retain low 
costs in program implementation, and that fears that refugees would represent a threat 
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to Canada’s national security could also be used to justify over-riding the obligation to 
protect these individuals under the 2002 IRPA.  
 
IF YOU CAN’T RESETTLE EVERYONE, WHOM WILL YOU CHOOSE?   
 
Despite the fact that the original aim of resettlement, according to UNHCR, was to 
resettle the most vulnerable members of refugee populations, Stein had observed that 
faced with an overwhelming number of individuals potentially in need of resettlement, 
and the integration challenges faced by the resettled populations and their host 
communities, resettlement communities started questioning who was truly deserving 
of resettlement.  It was notably reported that the fact that Iraqis were not vulnerable in 
the same manner as Canadian SPOs had been used to receiving in the recent past, such 
as the Karen, the Rohingyas, the Hmong, and others, may have worked against the 
Iraqi group, and quickly created a reputation for the Iraqis as being demanding, and 
perhaps ‘not sufficiently’ vulnerable.  This did raise the question of whether refugees 
like the Iraqis, having for the most part a formal educated and originating mainly from 
urban contexts, were truly in need, or even deserving of resettlement.  On the other 
hand, it could also be argued that considering their urban and educational background, 
Iraqis may not require such a high investment in the services available once in the 
country of resettlement, which would thus free up resources, and allow for a greater 
number of individuals to be resettled for the same cost.   
 
Alternatively, one of Lanphier’s models of resettlement indicated that when the need 
for cultural adaptation was too high, there would be a tendency to reduce the volume 
of resettled individuals.262  AIC and Williams had highlighted, however, that a true 
willingness to resettle all those in need of resettlement should logically be followed by 
                                                           
262 Lanphier, C. M. Ibid. 
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a financial commitment to allow for ensuing initiatives to become effective remedies 
to the issue at hand.  The resettlement of vulnerable populations would thus imply the 
need for humanitarian assistance for some time after resettlement has taken place.  If 
the will to support the resettled populations after their arrival in the country of asylum 
is not present, there is a high risk, as it was reported by Pressé and Williams, for these 
populations to remain in a liminal state for a number of years following their 
resettlement.  This risk was expressed by CIC, when speaking to the subject of the 
immigrant loan program, and of the reports from different actors on the highly 
detrimental effect the travel loans signed by refugees prior to their arrival to Canada 
were having on these families.    
 
Despite all these considerations, however, CIC admitted that in situations where the 
Resettlement Division is not given sufficient funds to resettle all those deemed 
vulnerable and in need of resettlement according to UNHCR’s assessment, CIC would 
rather use resettlement strategically, in order to attempt to alleviate the ill 
consequences of mass refugee flows in the regions of asylum for as many individuals 
as possible.  This strategic use of resettlement also pre-supposes that voluntary 
repatriation and integration in the region or country of asylum are the two preferred 
solutions to refugee crisis, while resettlement would only (and still) be used in cases 
where individuals could not find peace and safety in their country of origin or of 
asylum.  In doing so, CIC thus seems to have resorted to making the optimal use of 
the limited budget made available to them for the purposes of resettlement.  
 
It is suggested, however, that the principles supporting the strategic use of 
resettlement are not applied in the case of the PSR program.  While it was considered 
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that the PSR program allowed for Canada to resettle some of the vulnerable cases that 
may have fallen through the cracks of the GAR program, IFR pointed to the fact that 
the initial selection of PSRs was entirely up to the private sponsors, who would not 
have an incentive to select the most vulnerable.  Promoting the increase of PSRs 
rather than GARs would thus also mean promoting the resettlement of less vulnerable 
individuals over the most vulnerable members of a given refugee population.   
 
Williams had also noted the absence of a system in Canada that would allow for the 
resettlement of severe medical cases, which would generally be referred by UNHCR 
to either the U.S. or other resettlement countries with referral systems that would 
allow for the expedient movement of these cases.  According to both CIC and 
Williams, however, Canada is in the process of determining whether the creation of 
such a referral mechanism for this specific population would be possible in the future, 
especially due to the high number of highly vulnerable medical cases in need of 
resettlement and of urgent medical care, and to UNHCR’s strong encouragement for 
Canada and other resettlement countries to do so.      
 
UNHCR AND CANADA’S RESETTLEMENT POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
 
Stein had identified another factor that could explain the decrease in resettlement 
numbers worldwide at the time of his writing in 1983, which was UNHCR’s 
prioritization of other durable solutions to refugee situations, where resettlement 
would only be applied when other solutions would not be possible to implement.  
Indeed, according to the findings of this research, second to economic factors, 
UNCHR’s positions and calls for action seem to be the most influential on the 
decision-making process relating to Canada’s refugee resettlement programs.   
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In fact, when speaking of the Iraqi refugee resettlement context, CIC’s actions were 
always preceded by the actions of UNHCR.  The reason for this seems more evident 
when speaking of the GAR program, which consists of the resettlement of individuals 
who are referred by UNHCR.  In the case of the Iraqi refugee crisis, Canada did not 
seem to take the lead to call for UNHCR to begin resettlement operations in the 
Middle East region for this group, but rather simply followed suit after the United 
States’ request for UNHCR to begin resettlement operations for the Iraqi population.    
 
Influence of UNHCR’s directives on Canada’s adjudication of PSRs 
Canada only began resettling Iraqis in large numbers – through its GAR and PSR 
programs – after resettlement operations were initiated by the United States and 
UNHCR.  As pointed out by Williams, and also confirmed during the author’s 
interview with CIC, UNHCR involvement is actually not required at any level for the 
Canadian PSR program to be implemented.  Considering this, one fact that is difficult 
to explain is why a number of Iraqi PSR cases submitted to CIC before 2007 were 
denied resettlement, only to be accepted after the beginning of large-scale resettlement 
operations for Iraqis.  Prior to 2007, UNHCR was encouraging countries of 
resettlement to follow a policy of containment for Iraqis, i.e. keeping Iraqis in the 
Middle East region in the hopes that the situation in Iraq would improve and thus 
allow for the population to gradually return.  The other aim of UNHCR in 
encouraging countries to adopt a containment policy prior to 2007 was due to the 
Agency’s prognosis that the initiation of resettlement activities would result in an 
increased pull factor to the countries where resettlement operations would be taking 
 105 
place.  UNHCR feared that this would in turn further strain the already over-burdened 
economies and infrastructures of the asylum states.    
 
As suspected by Williams, it is perhaps in this light that Canada made the decision not 
to approve any PSR cases prior to 2007, considering that another possible durable 
solution could possibly be in sight for these cases.  Upon considering the factors 
brought forward by UNHCR and CIC, it seemed that their decision was more based 
on the prevention of aggravating factors, rather than the lack of political will to assist 
Iraqis. 
 
UNHCR’s dependence on sovereign states’ contributions 
It should be noted that UNHCR cannot initiate any resettlement operations without a) 
the commitments of resettlement states to offer a certain number of resettlement 
space, and b) the financial commitments of various contributors.  Below is a table 
outlining various countries’ contributions to UNHCR per capita. 
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Table 4: Country contributions to UNHCR per capita, 2009 
 
 Population* Contribution to 
UNHCR** 
Contribution per 
capita (USD) 
Norway 4,660,539 60,642,612 13.01 
Sweden 9,059,651 107,885,397 11.90 
Denmark 5,500,510 52,132,909 9.48 
Netherlands 16,715,999 80,617,231 4.82 
USA 307,212,123 640,726,528 2.09 
Australia 21,262,641 32,873,505 1.55 
Canada 33,487,208 45,561,841 1.36 
Spain 40,525,002 39,539,195 0.98 
Japan 127,078,679 110,553,715 0.87 
United Kingdom 61,113,205 41,997,362 0.69 
Germany 82,329,758 54,529,973 0.66 
European Commission 499,723,520*** 126,947,661 0.25 
 
*With the exception of European Commission data, figures obtained from Central Intelligence Agency. 
(2010). CIA – The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
**UNHCR. (2009e). UNHCR – 2009 Contributions to UNHCR Programmes, as of 31 December 2009 
(table), http://www.unhcr.org/45f025a92.html  
***Eurostat. (2010). Eurostat – Tables, Graphs and Maps Interface (TGM) table,  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelectio
n=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 
 
As can be noted above, Canada only contributed USD 1.36 per capita to UNHCR in 
2009, far behind Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 45% less than the U.S.  In net 
numbers, Canada was the ninth largest contributor to UNHCR in 2009.  However, this 
data should also be put in contrast to the fact that Canada is the second largest 
resettlement country after the Unites States.  Thus, although Canada does not seem to 
be one of the top donors to UNHCR, it does seem to contribute to the refugee aiding 
efforts in various forms.  In fact, UNHCR insisted that CIC was considered to be a 
key partner to UNHCR and leader in the resettlement community in the context of the 
strategic implementation of resettlement.  UNHCR commended Canada’s significant 
participation in the resettlement of the Bhutanese from Nepal and Iraqis from different 
parts of the Middle East.   
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Resettlement is still considered to be a privilege for those resettled, and a voluntary 
activity for potential resettlement countries to implement, rather than an obligation 
based one of Canada’s signed agreements.  The principle of responsibility sharing 
simply implies that the country contributes in some way to attempt to alleviate refugee 
crises, and assist of those in a state of asylum.  According to the principle of state 
sovereignty, it is entirely up to the state to decide to what extent their contributions to 
alleviate a given refugee crisis will reach.  In such an equation, however, states are left 
with the upper hand, while UNHCR and other refugee-aiding organizations must 
attempt to find the best solutions for all those affected, given the limited resources 
made available to them, and the fact that some levels of the Canadian government will 
only accept to commit a certain level of budget that would serve to accomplish just 
enough to uphold Canada’s humanitarian image.  However, at the level of the 
Resettlement Division of CIC, it was found that Canadian civil servants will generally 
follow UNHCR’s footsteps, respond to UNHCR’s calls for action, and do its best to 
make the most effective use of a constrained budget.  
 
UNHCR-CIC relationship at play in the context of the resettlement of Iraqis 
It was clear from the author’s reading of the meeting minutes of the Standing 
Committee for Citizenship and Immigration where UNHCR spoke before the 
Committee, and from the author’s interview with UNHCR, that UNHCR was hoping 
for Canada to increase the budget allocation to its refugee program for Iraqis in order 
to be able to refer a larger number of Iraqis for resettlement to Canada, and to further 
finance the activities of UNHCR in the Middle East region, including the assistance 
and support for those still in a state of asylum.  It was understood that UNHCR was in 
a delicate position, where it had to both repeatedly express gratitude to all donors for 
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all their contributions on one end, but yet also continue to appeal to these same donors 
for more funding on the other.   
 
CANADA’S RESETTLEMENT MODEL AND POLICIES 
 
Low volume of resettlement focusing on economic integration 
With his resettlement models, Lamphier’s categorized Canada’s resettlement program 
as a low-volume model focused on economic integration, while the Province of 
Quebec’s model was also low-volume, but was said to focus more on cultural 
integration.  However, the ‘ability to establish’ criterion included in the Canada 
chapter of UNHCR resettlement handbook would indicate otherwise; that Canada 
would indeed focus on a low-volume model, but that it would aim for both economic 
and cultural integration, such as highlighted by Basok and Casasola.263  In fact, CIC’s 
Minister currently wishes to increase newcomers’ knowledge of their civic rights and 
responsibilities, and increase the eligibility criteria for Canadian citizenship.264  He 
also wishes to increase language requirements for both individuals wishing to apply 
for immigration, and eventually for Canadian citizenship.265  This is expected to 
translate into a focus on selecting migrants who are more likely to integrate quickly 
and easily, and on an informal level, reduce the tendency to select individuals (i.e. 
refugees) who would not have such characteristics, and would require more public 
efforts to facilitate their economic integration and cultural adaptation to Canada. 
 
Policy pilars and consultations with stakeholders 
                                                           
263 Casasola, M. (2001). Ibid. 
264 JasonKenney.ca. (2009). Launch of Discover Canada: The rights and responsibilities of citizenship, 
http://www.jasonkenney.com/EN/4961/101167  
265 CIC. (2009g). Speech – Minister Jason Kenney, March 20, 2009, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2009/2009-03-20.asp  
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Canada and the rest of the resettlement community agreed on implementing 
resettlement as a tool for individual protection, as a strategy, as an avenue to share 
global responsibilities, and as a possible durable solution.  Using this framework as a 
starting point, CIC embarks on domestic and international consultations to determine 
which groups should be prioritized by Canada for resettlement.  These consultants 
include various domestic stakeholders, and refugee sponsors for the first time in 2009, 
as well as UNHCR, other resettlement countries, CIC missions abroad, among others.  
However, Basok did highlight that such consultation processes, as well as the 
appearance that PSRs and SPOs had some influence on the direction of Canada’s 
resettlement program, was just that – merely an appearance.  She argued that the 
Canadian government had in fact complete control over all aspects of the program, 
and all decisions regarding who would be resettled to Canada. 
 
Principle of responsibility sharing favoring some over others 
CIC highlighted that an inevitable consideration is the existence of previous multi-
year resettlement commitments, and Canada’s commitment to assisting its nearest 
refugee population in need, i.e. the Colombians.  CIC explained that Colombians 
constituted one of the top source countries for refugees for the last two decades, 
because of the simple fact that they represented the largest refugee population in need 
of settlement in the Western hemisphere.  Canadians may have also felt less 
concerned by the plight of Iraqis, compared to that of these Colombians, or Afghans, 
or other groups, due to their voluntary lack of involvement in the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq.  Thus, from a socio-psychological point of view, it would seem 
comprehensible, as also argued by the IFR and the ICC, that Canadians would feel 
less compelled or obligated to assist the Iraqi refugee population, if given the 
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obligation to choose between many groups in need of a durable solution to their state 
of asylum. 
 
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS LEADING TO DELAYS 
 
As mentioned above, the cost-effectiveness of resettlement operations is an important 
consideration in the policy-making process relating to resettlement.  In addition, 
following the period of time necessary to determine whether resettlement will be the 
appropriate durable solution for a given group at a given time, resettlement operations 
will take considerable time to get underway, especially if sufficiently substantial 
UNHCR infrastructure does not exist in the affected region.  One aspect that is 
particularly labor-intensive for UNHCR is the range of referral and procedural 
requirements asked of UNHCR from all resettlement countries, such as the different 
formats and types of referral forms, different medical examination procedures, 
exclusions, security check procedures, etc.  Other operational considerations include 
the start up time for the CIC offices in Canada processing PSR files before they are 
sent abroad, as well as the difficulty, or near impossibility, due to the numerous 
factors involved, of predicting when medical examinations, security checks, and other 
formalities will be completed in order for the refugees to start departing from their 
country of asylum to the country of resettlement. 
 
IRAQI CHRISTIANS RESETTLED IN HIGHER PROPORTIONS  
 
In the case of Iraqis, it was suspected at the beginning of this research that Canada’s 
resettlement of Iraqis was largely a Christian movement. It was also the observation of 
the CIC officers on the ground that a higher proportion of Christians were being 
interviewed for resettlement.  CIC also admitted that the Iraqis sponsoring individuals 
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from Canada were for the most part Christian, and thus also tended to sponsor either 
Christian relatives or members of their former communities in Iraq.  Explanations 
regarding this observation varied: first, UNHCR admitted that the proportion of 
Christian registrations in the UNCHR office in the regions (14%) was higher than the 
proportion of Iraqi Christians in Iraq (3%) and that Iraqi Christians constituted a large 
portion of those referred for resettlement.  These proportions could indicate that the 
Iraqi Christians had stronger cases for resettlement, in that they were less likely than 
others to find a durable solution in their country of asylum or Iraq.  Alternatively, this 
could also indicate that the Iraqi Christians were unjustly favored over others to be 
considered for resettlement.  However, Williams, who witnessed the resettlement 
operations in Damascus, claimed that UNHCR’s process seemed balanced and non-
discriminatory, while others were of the opinion that the CIC Minister gave 
preferential treatment to Christian refugee groups, rather than Muslims.  However, no 
evidence of such bias on the part of the Minister was collected in the context of this 
research.     
 
POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF DIVERGING OPINIONS WITHIN THE IRAQI COMMUNITY 
 
The diversity of the perspectives expressed by the Iraqis interviewed for this research 
project was also particularly interesting.  It was expected that all Iraqi individuals in 
Canada would be hoping and lobbying for the government to increase Iraqi 
resettlement numbers.  However, this was not found to be consistently the case.  ICC 
and IFR’s Mr. Mashrook had similar perspectives in that they held a positive regard 
for the Canadian government and its refugee resettlement program.  They believed, 
however, that as much as Canada and others could come together to resettle a large 
number of Iraqis, this would not bring a resolution to the Iraqi crisis.  Rather, 
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resettlement could only serve as a solution for a handful of individuals, and a 
temporary solution at best for all those who would remain in the countries of asylum 
and who would thus have access to a greater proportion of the available support 
services and financial assistance.  They did also see, however, the potential advantage 
of having the resettled individuals send remittances to the asylum population or to the 
country of origin, to assist with post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
Contrary to his IFR colleagues and to the ICC, the perspective of Mr. Saeed was that 
Canada was not doing enough to assist the Iraqi population, more particularly in terms 
of resettlement.  He felt that Canada was not resettling a large enough number of 
Iraqis, and that those it was resettling were not necessarily the most vulnerable.  He 
argued, notably, that by increasing the resettlement spaces allocated to the PSRs, the 
government was   allowing private sponsors to determine who would be prioritized.  
Saeed warned that these would not necessarily be the most vulnerable, but rather, 
simply those who had the chance of having pre-existing ties with Iraqis in Canada, or 
those who had the chance of being selected by sponsorship groups who would have 
had their case brought to their attention through a diversity of possibility of channels.  
Saeed thus felt that Canada should instead increase the number of GARs, in order to 
assist those most in need, and therefore also free up the likely higher proportion of 
services and financial assistance these more vulnerable individuals would be utilizing 
in the communities of asylum surrounding Iraq.    
 
The ICC representative, on the other hand, was of the opinion that Canada was 
meeting its obligations in terms of resettlement, although he felt that those who were 
resettled were not receiving enough assistance upon arrival.  He mainly hoped that the 
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government would recognize the work that ICC done voluntarily to assist newly 
arrived Iraqi refugees, and that with this recognition they could be financially 
supported by the government to continue this work for Iraqis and also others in need 
upon arrival. 
 
Based on Pressé’s shared perspective, it could be argued that the inconsistency in the 
message coming from the Iraqi community in Canada may have made their lobbying 
less strong in the eyes of the government, and therefore less worthy of attention.  As 
was found in this research, other than the lobbying done by Iraqi Christian groups, and 
the IFR’s and ICC’s participation in CCR’s call for action, neither the Canadian 
public nor a considerable number of Iraqis in Canada were found to have made public 
requests for the government to increase its resettlement numbers, or its assistance to 
Iraq and its people.  It can be argued that perhaps one strong and unified voice coming 
from the Iraqi communities in Canada would have given the Canadian government 
more incentive to act sooner and in a more significant manner to assist Iraqi refugees.       
 
VARYING VISIONS OF THE CANADIAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS’ CORE AIMS  
 
Those interviewed in the context of this study each held a unique vision of what the 
Canadian refugee resettlement program should aim to accomplish.  This vision 
inevitably colored the nature of their advocacy, as well as the influence of this 
advocacy on the policy-making process.  ICC’s vision of the Canadian refugee 
resettlement program, shared by IFR’s Mr. Mashrook, was that resettlement only 
represented one of many options available to Iraqi refugees and potential immigrants, 
that the program is and should remain fair and generous, and that, according to 
Altalibi, Canada should continue to resettle Iraqis, in the realm of the government’s 
 114 
stated capacity to do so.  IFR’s Mr. Saeed’s vision of the program was that it should 
focus on the most vulnerable portion of the refugee population.  
 
Alternatively, while the Canadian government’s principal aim in implementing its 
resettlement program is to maintain its humanitarian tradition, the aim of Ms. Pressé is 
for the resettlement program to be as effective as possible in relieving the risks 
experienced by the refugees themselves, as well as relieving the pressures experienced 
by asylum states, other resettlement countries, and UNHCR.  Her intentions thus 
seemed to be rooted in humanitarian goals, whilst being limited by the resources made 
available to CIC’s Resettlement Division by elected officials.  On the other hand, 
UNHCR’s hope was for the Canadian government to allocate more funds to its 
refugee-aiding programs, both abroad, through resettlement or assistance to those 
living in countries of asylum, and in Canada, through its in-land asylum system.  
UNHCR thus envisioned the refugee program being used as a tool for Canada to meet 
its fair share of responsibility regarding the world’s refugee population, and that 
together with the other members of the international community, it would help Canada 
find durable solutions to these crises.  UNHCR’s vision and advocacy thus seemed 
highly effective and influential in this policy making process, seemingly due to the 
fact that it was based on the principles enounced in the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol, as well as on the principle of responsibility sharing, which CIC explained 
were essentially the basis of the Canadian refugee resettlement programs.   
 
Lastly, the perspective of Williams and AIC was that Canada should be using its 
resettlement program first and foremost to meet the human and moral obligations that 
derive from the event of refugee situations.  Williams and AIC consider that these 
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human and moral obligations are inherently linked to international and domestic legal 
obligations, which, they argue, are not being adequately considered by Canada on 
several levels.  Williams held that Canada will always seem like it is doing the right 
thing, however, when having to choose between meeting its most basic obligations, 
and acting on moral and humanitarian grounds that would go beyond these 
obligations, Canada would seem to often choose to follow easier and most cost-
effective route.   
 
The main issue with these visions, however, was the fact that they were based on 
international principles that either Canada had not adhered to or ratified, or that 
Canada’s positions on these international laws was unclear, and subject to 
interpretation, most particularly with regards to statelessness.  Thus, although AIC and 
CCR would hope for CIC to consider its humanitarian and moral obligations and 
resettle Iraqis as a result of it, numerous other factors are at play and considered by 
CIC to be inevitable for them to consider. The perspective of CIC in comparison to 
the perspective of AIC and CCR would therefore seem irreconcilable.  The one 
element that would seem to have a considerable influence on the government officials 
deciding on the budget for resettlement program, however, would be the Canadian 
voters.  If AIC and CCR would target these and manage to convince voters that the 
resettlement program deserves further funding, and that more Iraqis or others need to 
be resettled, the politicians are likely to react favorably in order to secure their vote in 
future elections.      
 
In sum, in order for lobbying efforts relating to the protection of refugees and asylum 
seekers to be effective and to have an influence on the policy-making process, it was 
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found that these should specifically focus on the ratification of these international 
instruments, or on Canada’s interest in making such legal commitments, rather than 
lobby specifically on issues for which Canada has no legal obligation to act on.  If 
advocacy movement does not directly relate to the government’s core aims and 
directives, these movements essentially lose their purpose.  As confirmed by CIC, the 
influence of these individuals and organizations on the policy making process will 
strongly be linked to the way in which their input is delivered, and to the 
government’s perceived relevance of their input.       
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CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this research was to identify the various influences on the policy-making 
process relating to the Canadian Refugee Resettlement Program, more specifically in 
relation to the Iraqi refugee movement.  The author explored pre-existing literature on 
the topic, which had focused mainly on resettlement trends dating a few decades.  
Resettlement had gone from being one of the main durable solutions implemented in 
responses to the world’s refugee crises in the seventies and eighties, to being one of 
the last options considered.  However, resettlement is still part and parcel of Canada’s 
humanitarian agenda, despite its high costs and limited breadth.  Thus, considering in 
particular the timing and the seemingly limited scope of the resettlement of Iraqis to 
Canada, the author examined the rationale behind the continued use of this durable 
solution to refugee crises. 
 
By interviewing various actors in the field, including a Canadian government 
representative, UNHCR, Amnesty International Canada, and others, the author found 
that one of the main factors influencing the number of Iraqis who are resettled to 
Canada is the limited budget allocated to the resettlement program, which is 
determined by the Canadian Parliament, which is in turn mainly influenced by 
Canadian voters, and the preservation of Canada’s humanitarian image.  The other 
main influencing body is UNHCR, which will assess a given refugee populations’ 
needs in terms of durable solutions, and bring resettlement countries such as Canada 
to take one course of action or another to alleviate a given crisis.  Another important 
finding was related to the influence of public lobbying.  Although the public and 
lobby groups did not have as great an influence in Canada’s decision to increase the 
resettlement targets for Iraqis as they had for other groups in the past, this research 
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indicated that if and when masses of Canadian voters voice their concern on a 
particular issue, at multiple levels, this will inevitably have some desired 
repercussions on the government decision makers.   
 
Although this research was exploratory and thus limited in scope, future research 
projects on this topic should seek the perspectives of those determining programmatic 
budgets within the government of Canada, such as Members of Parliament or their 
staff.  A larger sample of Iraqi Canadians could also be surveyed, considering the 
differences in opinions observed in the small sample used in this research.  Parallel 
research projects on the Canadian refugee resettlement system could explore the 
policy-making process relating to groups other than the Iraqis, such as the Bhutanese, 
with considerably higher settlement needs, or the Darfuris, also with high needs, but 
set in a far more challenging asylum environment. 
 
Of particular interest would also be an exploration of the influences on the policy-
making process of other countries’ resettlement programs, such as that of Australia, 
whose program is of comparable breadth to the Canadian one.  The American 
program could also be analyzed, in order to compare the influences on a policy-
making process in a comparable socio-cultural context, but within a different frame of 
political, economic, and geographic factors. 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
1. INTERVIEW WITH MS. DEBRA PRESSÉ, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA 
 
1. Could you describe the policy-making process involved in deciding  
i) how many refugees (particularly Iraqis) will be resettled to Canada in a given 
year, and; 
ii) what other measures are taken by the Canadian government to alleviate the 
current Iraqi crisis?  
a. What are the step-by-step procedures, from the initiation of a policy to its 
implementation? 
b. What factors (economic, legal/humanitarian, and political), influence this 
decision-making process? 
 
2. Would it be possible to obtain CIC’s latest budget for every year since the 2003-
2004 fiscal year? 
a. If not detailed in the published budget, what is Canada’s total budget 
dedicated to humanitarian programs? 
i. What proportion of this budget is dedicated to Iraq (i.e. total aid 
donated for reconstruction, assisting IDPs, assisting refugees in 
main countries of asylum, etc.)? 
ii. What proportion of this Iraq budget is dedicated to the resettlement 
of Iraqis? 
b. What is the yearly cost of Canada’s Refugee Resettlement program since 
2003?  What is the projected cost for this fiscal year 2009-2010? 
c. What proportion of this cost has been dedicated to the resettlement of Iraqi 
refugees?  If possible, can we obtain a breakdown of these expenditures for 
the Iraqi group, i.e. donations/expenditures to UNHCR, Canadian Embassy 
processing, CIC processing costs, Matching Center, Movements costs 
(IOM services including booking of flights, Canadian Orientation Abroad 
program, etc.) medicals assessments & flights (Are these included in 
budget? Or not included as these costs are charged to the applicants and 
repaid through the Immigrant Loan Program?), Canadian Border Services 
Agency processing incoming refugees at the airport, funds allocated to 
NGOs receiving refugees at the airport like ‘IRIS’, also Reception Houses, 
Service Providing Agencies, cost per applicant for the Interim Federal 
Health program, financial assistance for refugees, and costs related to the 
resettlement of Privately Sponsored Refugees?  Also, are there any other 
related costs? 
 
3. How many Iraqis has Canada resettled since 2003 (or even since 1991, if data is 
available) under the GAR program, the PSR program, or any other special 
program (One-Year Program, Urgent Protection Program (UPP), or other – please 
specify)? 
   
4. According to the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, Canada Chapter, “applicants 
must show potential to become self-sufficient and successfully establish in Canada 
within a 3 to 5 year time frame […] [although] this criteria does not apply to 
refugees determined by a visa officer who fall within the categories: ‘urgent need 
of protection’ or ‘vulnerable’.   
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a. In approximately what proportion of Iraqi refugee cases is the criteria of 
“potential to become self-sufficient and to successfully establish in 
Canada” applied? 
b. Are other criteria used in the selection of Iraqis refugees? 
 
5. Would it be possible to obtain a breakdown of the profile of the Iraqis resettled to 
Canada since 2003? 
 Separated by program (Government-Assisted, Privately Sponsored, or 
others) 
 According to religious group, ethnic background, male/females, family 
size, age, and according to UNHCR refugee category (medical needs, 
survivors of violence and torture, women at risk, etc.), etc. 
 
 
2. INTERVIEW WITH MR. MICHAEL CASASOLA, UNHCR OTTAWA  
 
1. What do you think influences Canada’s resettlement policies relating to Iraqis? 
a. Legal/humanitarian influences: 
b. Economic influences: 
c. Political influences: 
d. Other: 
 
2. Has UNHCR appealed to Canada in particular to resettle (more) Iraqi refugees?  If 
so: 
a. In what instances?   
b. What were Canada’s reactions to these appeals, and the results of these 
appeals? 
 
3. Do you believe that UNHCR, or other local or international NGOs, the Iraqi 
people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any influence on 
Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis? 
a. How so? 
b. If yes, what is the weight of these influences, and how do they play 
out? 
 
4. According to UNHCR, is Canada upholding its international legal obligations in 
relation to ratified, but not incorporated international laws relating to refugees? 
 
5. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burden-
sharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to 
the Iraqi crisis? 
 
6. Has Canada upheld its commitment to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, most particularly in relation to the Iraqi refugee 
crisis? How so? 
 
7. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies 
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis? 
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8. Is Canada upholding its humanitarian and non-discriminatory principles in the 
context of selecting refugees for resettlement?  (by applying, for example, the 
criteria of “potential to become self-sufficient and to successfully establish in 
Canada”, or by not resettling particular medical cases?) 
 
9. How many Iraqi refugee cases have been referred to Canada for resettlement since 
2003 (yearly breakdown)? 
 
10. How many have been accepted for resettlement to Canada since 2003 (yearly 
breakdown)? 
 
11. Out of all individuals/cases referred to Canada, are you able to provide us with the 
proportion of individuals/cases referred under each UNHCR refugee category 
(medical needs, survivors of violence and torture, women at risk, etc.) to Canada? 
 
12. If so, are you also able to provide us with the proportion of individuals under each 
UNHCR referral category that are approved for resettlement to Canada? 
 
13. According to UNHCR, is Canada resettling the most vulnerable refugees, the most 
likely to successfully establish, or both, 
a. Amongst the world refugee population? 
b. Amongst the Iraqi refugee population? 
 
 
3. INTERVIEW WITH MS. GRACE WU, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CANADA 
 
1. What do you think influences Canada’s resettlement policies relating to Iraqis? 
a. Legal/humanitarian influences: 
b. Economic influences: 
c. Political influences: 
d. Other: 
 
2. In December 2007, Amnesty International Canada’s secretary General, Mr. Alex 
Neve, stood before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration and 
urged the Canadian government to development an action plan for Iraqi refugees, 
that would ensure the following:  
 
1) that multilateral and NGO efforts to provide assistance to Iraqi refugees 
and internally displaced Iraqis receive adequate and sustained funding;  
 
2) that front-line states, particularly Syria and Jordan, are provided with the 
financial support needed to ensure they can provide the level of protection and 
assistance required;  
 
3) that more generous opportunities for resettlement become available so that 
vulnerable Iraqis who are not safe or adequately protected in the region can 
move to other countries; and  
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4) that there is a common commitment from all countries in the region and 
around the world to refrain from forced returns to Iraq.266 
  
Does Amnesty International Canada feel that the Canadian Government has acted on 
any of these appeals?  If yes, how so? 
 
3. Has Amnesty appealed to Canada in particular to alleviate the Iraqi refugee 
situation in other instances?  If so, what were Canada’s reactions to these appeals, 
and the results of these appeals? 
 
4. Do you believe that Amnesty, or other local or international NGOs, the Iraqi 
people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any influence on 
Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis? 
a. How so? 
b. If yes, what is the weight of these influences, and how do they play out? 
 
5. According to Amnesty, is Canada upholding its international legal obligations 
relating to refugees? 
 
6. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burden-
sharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to 
the Iraqi crisis? 
 
7. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies 
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis? 
 
8. Is Canada upholding its humanitarian and non-discriminatory principles in the 
context of selecting refugees for resettlement?  (by applying, for example, the 
criteria of “potential to become self-sufficient and to successfully establish in 
Canada”, or by not resettling particular medical cases?) 
 
 
4. INTERVIEW WITH THE IRAQI FEDERATION OF REFUGEES  
 
1. What do you think influences Canada’s refugee resettlement policies relating to 
Iraqis?  
a. Legal/humanitarian influences 
b. Economic influences 
c. Political influences 
d. Other? 
 
2. Did your organization, or members of your organization, appeal to the Canadian 
government to not get involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq?  If yes: 
a. How so? 
                                                           
266 Parliament of Canada. (2007). House of Commons Committees - CIMM (39-2) - Edited Evidence - 
Number 007 (Official version), 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3205721&Language=E&Mode=1
&Parl=39&Ses=2#Int-2266917 
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b. According to you, what was the weight of your organization’s appeal in 
Canada’s decision relating to not getting involved in the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq? 
 
3. Has your organization appealed to the Canadian government to get (further) 
involved in alleviating the Iraqi refugee crisis?  If yes: 
a. How so? 
b. According to you, what has been the weight of your organization’s appeals 
on Canada’s policy-making process relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis? 
  
4. Do you believe your organization, or other local or international NGOs, the Iraqi 
people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any influence on 
Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis? 
a. How so? 
b. If yes, what is the weight of this influence, and how do you think it plays 
out? 
 
5. According to you, is Canada upholding its international legal obligations in 
relation to international laws relating to refugees? 
 
6. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies 
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis? 
 
7. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burden-
sharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to 
the Iraqi crisis? 
 
8. According to you, among the world’s Iraqi refugee population, is Canada 
resettling a) the most vulnerable refugees, b) those most likely to successfully 
establish in Canada, or c) both? 
 
 
5. INTERVIEW WITH MS. GLYNIS WILLIAMS, CCR, ACTION RÉFUGIÉS MONTREAL, AND 
FORMER ICMC DEPLOYEE TO UNHCR SYRIA 
 
1. What do you think influences Canada’s resettlement policies relating to Iraqis  
a. Legal/humanitarian influences 
b. Economic influences 
c. Political influences 
d. Other? 
 
2. Did CCR appeal to the Canadian government to not get involved in the 2003 
invasion of Iraq?  If yes: 
a. How so? 
b. What was the weight of CCR’s appeal in Canada’s decision relating to not 
getting involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq? 
 
3. Has CCR appealed to the Canadian government to get (further) involved in 
alleviating the Iraqi refugee crisis?  If yes: 
a. How so? 
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b. What has been the weight of CCR’s appeals Canada’s policy-mking 
process relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis? 
  
4. Do you believe the Canadian Council for Refugees, or other local or international 
NGOs, the Iraqi people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any 
influence on Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of 
Iraqis? 
a. How so? 
b. If yes, what is the weight of this influence, and how does it play out? 
 
5. Is Canada upholding its international legal obligations in relation to ratified, but 
not incorporated international laws relating to refugees? 
 
6. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies 
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis? 
 
7. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burden-
sharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to 
the Iraqi crisis? 
 
8. Is Canada upholding its humanitarian and non-discriminatory principles in the 
context of selecting refugees for resettlement?  (by applying, for example, the 
criteria of “potential to become self-sufficient and to successfully establish in 
Canada”, or by not resettling particular medical cases?) 
 
 
9. Is Canada resettling the most vulnerable refugees, the most likely to successfully 
establish, or both, 
a. Amongst the world refugee population? 
b. Amongst the Iraqi refugee population? 
 
 
6. INTERVIEW WITH MR. MOAYED ALTALIBI, IRAQI COMMUNITY CENTER OF 
MONTREAL 
 
1. What do you think influences Canada’s refugee resettlement policies relating to 
Iraqis  
a. Legal/humanitarian influences 
b. Economic influences 
c. Political influences 
d. Other? 
 
2. Did your organization, or members of your organization, appeal to the Canadian 
government to not get involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq?  If yes: 
a. How so? 
b. According to you, what was the weight of your organization’s appeal in 
Canada’s decision relating to not getting involved in the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq? 
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3. Has your organization appealed to the Canadian government to get (further) 
involved in alleviating the Iraqi refugee crisis?  If yes: 
a. How so? 
b. According to you, what has been the weight of your organization’s appeals 
on Canada’s policy-making process relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis? 
  
4. Do you believe your organization, or other local or international NGOs, the Iraqi 
people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any influence on 
Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis? 
a. How so? 
b. If yes, what is the weight of this influence, and how do you think it plays 
out? 
 
5. According to you, is Canada upholding its international legal obligations in 
relation to international laws relating to refugees? 
 
6. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies 
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis? 
 
7. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burden-
sharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to 
the Iraqi crisis? 
 
8. According to you, among the world’s Iraqi refugee population, is Canada 
resettling a) the most vulnerable refugees, b) those most likely to successfully 
establish in Canada, or c) both? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
